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Abstract

This thesis is an examination of the Kennedy election campaign. It is a narrative and
also a brief examination of how this campaign was put together and how the Kennedy
campaign staff was formed. The main perspective that it takes is from the vantage point of
the Cold War which serves as driving force behind the main issues of the campaign. It is the
primary argument of this thesis that the Kennedy campaign marked a period of transition
whereby America began to formulate a coherent ideological position for itself as leader of
the free world and come into its own as a super power with a strong and dynamic vision for
the future of mankind. Kennedy through the campaign began to symbolize this new active
vision of the United States as the main shaper of world affairs. Within the context of the
Cold War, the New Frontier that Kennedy proposed was the consolidation of the emerging
consumer culture that had been growing into a dominant force in American culture into a
broader ideological and idealistic vision of modern America that has proved a lasting impact
on American society.
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Introduction

In 1960 America found itself in a period of transition moving from a more

diplomatic and military phase of the Cold War and into a more ideological and
political one. Some sixteen years before, the American leadership had come to
realize that the end of World War II did not mean as well the end of its world wide
responsibilities. The United States would have to maintain a presence in
international affairs unprecedented in its history. There would be no escape from
the dangers of "entangling alliances,,, which George Washington had cautioned the
nation to avoid. There would be no peacetime disarmament which had been the
custom of American government throughout its history. Instead, the United States
found itself expanding foreign obligations, increasing its military budget, and
involving itself in a protracted struggle for its own survival with nothing less than the
future of the world at stake.
American strategy in fighting the Cold War as laid out by State Department
official George Kennan in his telegram from Moscow in 1947 was essentially a
strategy of attrition. American Cold War strategists set out a policy of containment
through treaties and alliances that in conjunction with increased American diplomatic
and economic pressure would bring about the collapse of the Soviet government.
Whatever the relative virtues of this policy--they seem to have been proven
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successful from a post-Cold War perspective--its overall strategy of an enforced and
prolonged stalemate would hardly prove to be appealing to the American people
who would ultimately have to provide the support to win the war.
The political problem of presenting to the American people a position for the
United States in the Cold War that was both appealing and gave them some feeling of
control and satisfaction began to make itself felt to American leadership early in the
fifties. The political movements which tried to grapple with an effective American
ideology in the Cold War during the fifties, however, produced no long-term
effects. They were the early attempts to formulate some sort of Cold War consensus
but were either recklessly exuberant or too feint-hearted. The initial popularity of
Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, for example, was due in no small measure to
his carefully devised role as a political outsider trying to get a handle on the Cold
War for the people. Eisenhower also cleverly distanced himself from the
unappealing nature of containment strategy in his 1952 presidential campaign by
proposing his own more active policy of "roll back" which would revitalize the
proven W. W .II themes of liberation in the minds of Americans still uncertain what
this whole Cold War was about. McCarthy, of course, would eventually wear out
his welcome with the American people and Eisenhower would think twice about his
aggressive policy of "roll back" once in office--"roll back" would seem highly ironic
after the failed Hungarian uprisings of 1956 and the complete failure of the
Eisenhower administration to provide assistance to the democratic forces there.
2
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Entering the 1960 election there was still no clear vision of what the Cold
War was all about, no concise definition of what Americans had at stake, and no plan
of what the United States had to offer the world if it were to win. In the previous
two global conllicts--in fact, in almost any war which America has ever involved
itself with--there were high minded and universal principles which were given as the
basis for American participation. Neither of those two wars were presented to the
American public as an effort to preserve the status quo; through Wilson's Fourteen
Points and Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter the unfortunate state of warfare was seen as a

catharsis for a better future. No proposals of similar substance had been done in the
Cold War in the years leading up to 1960. Something of comparable nature to either
the Atlantic Charter or Fourteen Points would be of obvious value in building the
support and moral of the American people, but even more importantly they would
be of infmite value in promoting America's image throughout the developing world
where the real battle of the Cold War was increasingly being fought.
When John F. Kennedy kicked off his campaign for the presidency of the
United States at the beginning of 1960, he did so with the concept of this period of
transition in the Cold War from a diplomatic and military phase to an ideological and
political phase firmly entrenched in the back of his mind. He and his campaign staff
were hopeful that this theme of a new era in American history would be a resonant
one with the American people and that it would echo his particular capabilities as a
leader. The Cold War, therefore, served as a crucial backdrop to the campaign of
3
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JFK. This thesis is a history of the key events and themes of that campaign and while
the main issues which Kennedy had to grapple with, his religion, his age, the broader
domestic issues of civil rights, and the enigmatic issue of national purpose were not
directly related to the Cold War--they would have all been prominent issues in
American presidential politics even during its pre-Cold War history--they were all
nonetheless brought into sharper focus and strongly influenced by it.
The metaphor of the "new frontier,, which the Kennedy campaign staff created
over the course of the campaign served to formulate an ideology of America, s Cold
War purpose. This transformed America,s effort in this struggle from a war of
attrition and stagnation into one action and meaning. Furthermore, the "new
frontier,, and the Kennedy campaign served as a larger metaphor for what life in the
modern world would be like. It laid the psychological ground work for a new world
of limitless possibilities unhindered by the restrictions of the past and formulated a
new vision of what an American citizen should be. The "new frontier'' beckoned
with a vision of a secular world where the rights of all religions would be respected
yet where religion in general would be marginalized in American culture. In the
place of religion, the "new frontier" posited a life of personal fulfillment as had long
been promoted through consumerism. It created from the process of consumerism a
deeper message of freedom of choice, freedom of expression, and more importantly
called for each citizen to realize himself or herself as pioneers on this "new frontier"
of human existence.
4
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In chronicling the main events leading up to and during the election, special
focus will be put on the role of presidential election in American society. What were
the cultural factors that motivated John Kennedy to want to become president? The
question will also be raised: what is it that the American culture looks for in a
president and what in particular was it about John Kennedy that was so appealing
then and even remains so now? What is the role of a presidential election in building
a national consensus and establishing national ideals? And ultimately, how well docs
it now serve its intended purpose of fostering public debate and arriving at valid
conclusions in its general function of maintaining a free and rational society.

5
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CHAPTER ONE

The Making of the Candidate

The family
One unique aspect that must be taken into account in any examination of
Kennedy or his presidential campaign is the Kennedy name itself, or rather the family
that lies behind that name. With perhaps the exception of the Roosevelt and Adams
families, no other name carries with it the same legacy as that of the Kennedy
family--for shear impact on a specific era in history a slight edge could probably be
given to the Kennedy' s in that they, at the same time, had in office a president, an
attorney general, and a U.S. senator. Only by examining some understanding of the
family and its background can one get some understanding of what was behind the
Kennedy presidential campaign and how it came together.
It has become a truism in history that it was primarily family ambition that
drove John F. Kennedy into politics. Upon the unfortunate death of his elder
brother in an ill fated bombing run over Europe at the close of the World War II, it
was expected of John, as the next in line, to step up and carry on the family name to
new achievements in the wake of their patriarch, Joseph P. Kennedy. One trait has
been forever linked to Joseph Kennedy, and subsequently to all Kennedys, and that
trait was ambition.
The Kennedys were notoriously ambitious. In looking at their ambition
historians have tended to approach it in two contrasting ways. The frrst and most
6
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flattering way could be summed up in a line often associated with the Kennedys:
((most men see things as they are and ask why? I look upon things that have never
been and ask why not?" In this light we can see the Kennedy ambition in fighting for
civil rights and for putting a man on the moon. The contrasting way oflooking upon
Kennedy ambition has taken shape more recently and approaches it from an irrational
and destructive need to dominate and win at all costs. It has been best exemplified by
the notorious womanizing among Kennedy men. It is more than likely that much of
this more negative view on Kennedy ambition is a backlash to the perhaps overly
idealistic view that has dominated the Kennedy image since the tragic assassinations
of both John and Robert. A better understanding of this ambition, however could be
attained by examining its origins and placing it within that context.
Coming from an immigrant background, specifically from an Irish Catholic
immigrant background, it would be safe to say that the Kennedy family, and the
Fitzgerald family (JFK's maternal grandparents), were well aware of power and the
dangers of not having enough of it. The immigrant experience as it was lived in the
United States during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the
twentieth was notoriously difficult, but beyond the sentimental portraits of hard
working and simple immigrants there is a more compelling vision of a hard nosed
battle for survival. Brought over mainly as fodder for the new and expanding
industry of America and the profit of its leaders, immigrants learned quickly to band
together within their own respective groups and fight to stake out a place for
7
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themselves in their new world, but it was this enforced closeness combined with
their Old World heritage of clandestine organization for self-defense that made the
Boston Irish political in a way unrivaled by any other immigrant group. [1] The
degree to which the Boston Irish Catholics were politicized and the success which
they had in making their organized influence felt often drew the ire and contempt of
the more established and "respectable" members of society. This suspicion of the
moral character of immigrants was often a subtle means of keeping them on the
defensive and thereby keeping them in their place. The Boston Brahmins would
speak contemptuously of the Irish political wards calling their leaders "muckrakers"
toiling in the mud of creation yet ignorant of the celestial beauty that lay above their
heads. But in the immigrant's struggle for survival, ambition was perhaps the only
distinction between life and death and the only way in which they could maintain
some sense of dignity in a world where their lives were held to be very cheap. In this
unforgiving environment, power was the only currency that had any real value and
was therefore not a trifle nor was its open pursuit looked upon as undignified.
As an Irishman, Joseph Kennedy was probably even more acutely aware than
other immigrants of what power in this New World meant and what the potential
dangers of not possessing it were. In America, as in Ireland, power had a name and a
background and that name and background was Anglo-Saxon and Protestant, two
concepts with which JPK was intimately familiar and from which he was congenitally
excluded. Joseph Kennedy had no misconceptions about the make-up of the world
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in which he was working but with a confidence that was not unusual among many
immigrant families he believed that America was truly a land of opportunity and also
that he could change that world. That was probably the extent of his sentimentality
concerning the American Dream and he was otherwise able through hard work,
guile, and some rule-bending to complete the first elementary requisite of power,
money. Joseph Kennedy came into the world with the advantages of a solidly
middle-class background but while still a relatively young man he went on to become
one of the richest men in the country. That, however, was only one half, and perhaps
the easiest part of the puzzle. Money was sufficient to get him access to the channels
of power but gaining acceptance in that incestuous labyrinth of personal connections
where the real business of the country was done was another matter.
It is worth noting- -even if it is fairly obvious--that America in the days of
Joseph Kennedy was subject to many unseen and unspoken restrictions. The
prohibition laws that Joseph Kennedy has often, with scorn, been accused of having
broken are an example of just this kind of undemonstrative hostility. Behind their
more obvious intention to improve public morality, there has also been noted a
deliberate attempt by some of the more entrenched immigrants of Anglo-Saxon or
Protestant heritage to exercise control over the newer immigrants through what was
viewed as their degenerative, and perhaps Catholic, habit of drink. There were, of
course, a myriad of other ways in which outsiders like the Kennedys could be made
to feel unwelcome. Much like in Ireland, in America many of those in power saw a
9
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man like JPK and his heritage as being suspect and not worthy oflegitimate power.
Unfortunately, the language of respectability has often been laden with cultural and
racial baggage and a tendency toward exclusion.
To his credit, Joseph Kennedy was not unduly intimidated by such sentiment,
and while it is not the intention of this author to exonerate all of his actions or to
state that his character was beyond all repute, it is still important to recognize that
many of the criticisms of his impropriety and ruthlessness, as accurate as some of
them may be, were, and to some degree still are, also laced with the less compelling
accusation of racial illegitimacy. To many Anglo-Saxons there was something
decidedly out of place about an Irishman running around in their world and
presuming to be their equal. To them the Irish were laborers. They were not
blessed with a cultural disposition to understand the more elevated concepts of
civilization and power. The simple fact of the matter was that an immigrant could
either accept this and resign himself to his designated position in life or he could
fight it. If he chose, like Joseph Kennedy, to fight it, however, he would find open
to him only the somewhat more suspect and less legitimate avenues to success. For
Joseph Kennedy it was always his self-designated job to claim his share of the power
and it would consequently always be the job of his predecessors to power to label
him with the title of outsider. Historians in judging the Kennedys have to take this
into account as well as the general move among all immigrants towards the claim of
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power and respectability in order to arrive at an accurate and fair assessment of the
"Kennedy ambition."
Though JPK managed to find some legitimacy through the title of Ambassador
which he scrupulously maintained all his life (he was appointed U. S. Ambassador to
the Court of St. James by Franklin Roosevelt just prior to WWII), his career in
politics eventually came upon a dead end . This probably had less to do with simple
prejudice than his own shortcomings perhaps further inflamed through prejudice. In
his tremendous and m ercurial rise to prominence, JPK had too many rough edges lo
move effectively and subtly through the thorny corridors of power--perhaps, one
such loose end was his own complicated feelings toward the English in particular and
the British Empire in general which made his own appointment as U .S. Ambassador
to England somewhat ironic and which also may have clouded his judgment
concerning the rise of Adolph Hitler. Probably with this in mind, Joseph saw to it
that each of his sons would have the habits of power that would allow him to succeed
where he had failed. All of his sons would attend English-style prep schools and
would go on to graduate, as he had, from that bastion of Anglo-American elitism and
power , Harvard University. JFK became something of an Anglophile; or, at least as
much of one as any Kennedy could be. The Kennedys, though defiant Irish
Catholics, were nonetheless adaptable.
Under their father's tutelage, all the Kennedy boys developed that sense of
assuredness and confidence that would later become the Kennedy mystique. His
11
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support for his sons was without question and nearly without limit. JFK often
remarked that his father would many times fight with him tooth and nail about any
given subject but wou ld still give his full support even when he went against his
father's advice or wishes. Clearly there is evidence of the father living out his destiny
through his sons but what son would not want the attention and support of his father
in his struggles with life? And whatever his personal ambitions m ay have been, there
does not seem to be any trace of unreasonable or selfish pressure placed on his sons.
He seems to have been an affectionate and loving father despite his demanding
nature; it is for this reason that President Kennedy upon visiting his father just after
his stroke said to one of his aids, "that man is r esponsible for it all. "[2]
It is interesting to note how little reference there is to the Kennedy matriarch,
Rose Kennedy, by any of the Kennedy sons in discussing their family background.
JFK even made some rather unkind remarks about his mother's lack of presence in
the family referring to her as something of a nonentity whose only response to life's
problems was to go shopping in Paris. [3] JFK 's comments about his mother are too
rare arrive at anykind of solid understanding of his true feelings toward her beyond
the odd remark made on the spur of the moment. It probably can be said, however,
that her apparently passive role is somewhat deceptive. Rose Kennedy and her
daughters as well had an eye for style and presentation, and although they were not
active as spokeswomen for their family in the sense that they shared the stage equally
with the Kennedy m en, it seems clear that they worked very hard behind the scenes
12
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and took great satisfaction in making sure that the young Kennedy men looked and
acted in a polished and presentable manner. Since Kennedy's image, was so central
to his appeal as a candidate the importance of this involvement by Rose Kennedy and
her daughters in John Kennedy' s effectiveness as a politician should not be
overlooked.
The Kennedy family had a tremendous influence on JFK , and it is beyond the
scope of this thesis to examine its influence on his psychology in any kind of depth.
Its influence on the campaign of 1960, however , is only slightly less great and
therefore has to be considered. President Truman, in explaining his reasons for not
supporting JFK in the primaries, said: "it's not the Pope but the pop that I'm
against." The Kennedys could draw equal amounts of hostility as they could draw
admiration and much of that hostility has tended to focus around their family
ambition. One could question why anyone would want to subject their son to the
ordeal of campaigning for and holding the office of the presidency. A fair argument
could be made that such an endeavor is unbalanced right from the outset ; however,
this nation of immigrants was founded upon the dream that any immigrant family, no
matter how humble its origins, could one day live to see one of its own assume the
greatest office of the land. Somewhere between the purity of that ideal and the
reality of the Kennedy campaign for the presidency is where one can fmd the true
nature of the much vaunted and vilified Kennedy ambition.
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Learning the ropes
That Kennedy name, of course, is also very much connected to the concept of
wealth and another one of the great rumors that was always attached to the Kennedy
campaigns was that they were in effect purchased by their wealth, that JFK relied
primarily upon his fathers money to win his elections. While of course the extra
money with which JFK was allowed to pad his campaign funds was certainly some
help to his cause, it would be a gross exaggeration to state that Kennedy relied upon
his wealth to win elections. From his first election in the 1946 to his last election in
1960, JFK proved to be one of the most hard fighting and hard working campaigners
of his day. During any given campaign, JFK followed rigorous schedules and endless
days for weeks on end and in most cases simply out-worked his opponent. [4]
His first political campaign began in 1946 and was for the 11 th congressional
district of Massachusetts for United States House of Representatives. After the grief
oflosing his eldest son Joseph, the Kennedy patriarch was intent upon his second
son, John, pursuing a political career. The quiet and bookish Jack, however, hardly
seemed suited to political life. Sick with various ailments for most of his life, JFK
was somewhat introverted and seemed more content to become a professor or
journalist. But his own experience as a correspondent for the Potsdam conference
and as a correspondent for the United Nations conference at San Francisco brought
him face-to-face with the great issues of his time. [5] Having appreciated the
momentous events that lay in the future for the United States and the world, JFK
14
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became more concerned with acting upon them rather than writing about them. By
the beginning of 1946, Kennedy was ready to follow a political career.
In trying to convince the young law school graduate, John Droney, to join his
fledgling campaign for the U.S. House, JFK would use this theme of the historical
import and impending change as he would later do throughout his career. When
Droney protested that he had no interest in politics and that he had to get started in
his own law practice, Kennedy replied: "if we,re going to change things the way they
should be changed, we all have to do things we don't want to do."
"I went to see him intending not to become involved, but with that little
speech I went completely the other way," Droney later recalled, explaining how he
became one of Jack's most active workers in 1946 and treasurer of the Kennedy
campaign organization. "I thought to myself, he has a very winning way and he is
obviously sincere, so I asked him immediately how I could help." [6]
It is important to place this statement within the context of the United States

at the close of World War II. Such statements which in this day seem hopelessly trite
were then, in an era of tremendous optimism, far more meaningful. Kennedy,
himself a veteran and having been wounded in the war, was probably as caught up in
the emotion that formed the basis of his rhetoric as was his intended audience. In any
case, he was able through the strength of his convictions and character as well as
through his rapidly developing charm and wit to win to his side a growing contingent
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of loyal and capable campaign workers who would be the core of his future campaign
efforts.
In a stroke of good luck for Kennedy, it just so happened in 1946 that the
eleventh congressional district became vacated by the newly elected mayor of
Boston, James Curley, a longtime Irish political figure and character in Boston area
politics. This was the same district which JFK's grandfather, John F. Fitzgerald,
represented some years before. Although the district had some sentimental
association with JFK, he was only vaguely aware of it and its constituents were only
vaguely aware of him.
Close presidential aide and confident David Powers recalls that he did not
give Kennedy much of a chance in the rough-and-tumble world of Boston politics. In
a Democratic primary that fielded ten candidates, most of whom had favorite son
status in either Charlestown, the North End, Cambridge, Beacon Hill, or Allston
which made up the cities of the eleventh district, Kennedy at first appeared to many
local constituents as merely a carpetbagger. As another famous Boston political
figure, connoisseur of politicking, and replacement for JFK in the House of
Representatives when he became Senator in 1952 Tip O'Neil once said: "all politics
is local". In the eleventh congressional district at the start of his campaign Kennedy
was a local nonentity.
Into this uphill battle Kennedy threw himself with all the resources and skill
he could command. In one of the young candidate's first political speeches to the
16
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Gold Star Mothers at the American Legion hall in Charlestown, Kennedy began to
show the ability to hold an audience that would later become the hallmark of his
campaigns. In remembering that night, David Powers later said:
I had been to a lot

ef political talks in Charlestown, but I never saw a reaction like this

one. I heard those women sayin9 to each other, ' isn't he a wondeiful boy, he reminds

ef

me so much
my own John, or my Bob.' They all had stars in their eyes. It took him a
ha!f an hour to pull himself awayfrom them. They didn't want him to leave. I said to
myself, I don't know what this 9uy's 9ot. He's no 9reat orator and doesn't say much,
but they certainly 90 crazy over him.{7]

After Kennedy had fmally managed to make his way out of the hall, he turned to
Powers and said to him, "How do you think I did?" To which, Powers responded,
"You were terrific. I've never seen such a reaction from a crowd of people in my
whole life. 11
"Then do you think you'll be with me?" Kennedy asked.
"I'm already with you , 11 Powers replied. And many years later when recalling
the event, Powers added sadly, "And I stayed with him from that day until
November 22, 1963, when I was riding in the car behind him in Dallas. 11 [8]
From his first campaign in 1946 to his last campaign in 1960, Kennedy's
campaign staff was constantly getting larger. Kennedy always saw to it that he would
attract the best and brightest minds to his side of the election battle, and he invariably
did. It was not Kennedy's money that brought these men over. In fact, many of his
most loyal and trustworthy aides have confessed to being a little skeptical at first,
often sketching a Little Lord Fauntleroy image as their preconceived impression of
17

Bryan Wuthrich
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960

him. Instead, it was Kennedy himself who won them over. His confident and
optimistic attitude, his quick and focused mind, and his charming aura were all
attributes that each of these men came away with upon their frrst meeting with
Kennedy, attributes which of course money can help in attaining but which can not
be purchased outright as they require a personal commitment and some natural
comprehension to be mastered. A great many wealthy men, perhaps even including
JFK's own father, lack these very qualities. One may ask where Kennedy might have
picked up these skills. There does not seem to be any clear answer, although
intuition may point to his mother and his many sisters as likely motivating forces as
well as an excellent sounding board and safe audience on which he could have
practiced these skills as a boy.
Putting together a good campaign staff is a necessary step for any successful
campaign. But that is only the beginning. An organization has to be put in place to
round up the necessary delegates, to recognize and contact the local political leaders,
and to recruit and train a volunteer workforce. A successful candidate also has to
create a system for canvassing and getting his name out to his potential constituency.
The foundation for all these elements was laid out during Kennedy's successful 1946
bid for the House of Representatives and improved upon during his next two
senatorial campaigns of 1952 and 1958.
Starting in 1946, Kennedy created a file of names of important delegates and
political leaders that would grow ever larger until in the years before 1960 reaching a
18
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nationwide scope. Kennedy, it has often been noted, showed an uncanny ability to
spot just who mattered politically in any given area and win them over to his side.
As his campaigns grew he was still able from memory to remember almost all of the
various local politicos throughout the broad area his campaigns encompassed. [9]
Kennedy's volunteer campaign force was legendary in its dedication and hard
work and campaign organizers would grow to rely upon them in the future.
Organizers, for example, would send them out to collect signatures--they collected
262,324 signatures for Kennedis nomination paper for the U.S. Senate in 1952, the
most in Massachusetts history (only 2,500 names were required by law) . They were
also asked to deliver Kennedy literature from door to door by hand instead of
through the mail as was commonly the practice, with the idea that receiving such
information was much more effective if done in person. According to Kenneth
O'Donnell; we learned that "the worst mistake you can make in running a political
campaign is to gather a crowd of enthusiastic supporters who are eager to help the
candidate and not give them any work to do." [10] In a Kennedy campaign there
would never be any shortage of volunteers or of work for them to do.
In 1946, the young Kennedy, perhaps already thinking ahead to a nationwide
profile, tried to distance himself as much as possible from the local campaign rituals
of Boston politics. Much to the dismay of both his father and his campaign staff,
Kennedy refused to wear a hat as was custom for Boston politicians --he would show
the same stubbornness during his presidential campaign in refusing to wear the
19
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traditional Texas ten gallon cowboy hat when campaigning with Lyndon Johnson
through his home state. Kennedy also tried to trim much of the overblown rhetoric
that had become a staple of Boston political speech making from his own campaign
speeches. But aside from these departures, Kennedy remained true to the most
essential element of the Irish American campaign style: he would take himself out
and to the best of his ability try to engage each of the voters in a personal and
face-to -face manner. This, many times, included actually going out and standing on
a street corner and physically shaking hands with every man and woman who passed.
Kennedy would often rise very early in the morning in order to go to a local factory
to shake the hand of every worker as he or she passed under the factory gate, have
breakfast, and repeat the process at another factory. [11 ]
In his first campaign, Kennedy and one of his aides went out into the streets of

the local Boston neighborhoods and rang door bells in order to personally introduce
himself to each of the neighborhood residents. It is easy to imagine the surprise and
appreciation of these people to frnd a candidate for the U.S. House of
Representatives waiting on their doorstep and asking for their vote. This sort of
campaign method, naturally, would prove more difficult to reproduce in Kennedy's
larger campaigns in the future, but even in his senate and presidential campaigns he
and his staff would constantly be on the lookout for techniques with which to
maintain this style.
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Since Kennedy>s style is central to his appeal in the 1960 campaign, it is
worthwhile here to take some time to try and define it so that we can follow how it
develops during the narrative. Probably the best approach to define Kennedy's style
is to determine it through what it was not. It was not like the traditional campaign
style of Boston's Anglo-Saxon community which could be described as a style of
polite and objective distance. Kennedy' s technique of personal and informal appeal
comes from an immigrant tradition which set itself in deliberate contrast to the
reserved Anglo-Saxon technique of campaigning. As a means of turning the tables on
their more established rivals, immigrant groups developed a technique of provocative
informality which often made their Yankee rivals uncomfortable frequently making
them to appear stuffy and close-minded. The most successful in this style of
campaigning in Boston was James Curley who had a manner and demeanor that was
as loved by the immigrant community of Boston as it was reviled by the Anglo-Saxon
community--these two reactions often had a mutually reinforcing effect on each
other, the more the immigrants loved Curley, the more the Yankees despised him
and visa versa.
Yet Kennedy's campaign style could also be described through its contrast to
traditional immigrant styles such as Curley. No matter how much Curley was loved
by Boston area immigrants, and particularly Irish immigrants, as being one of their
own and no matter how much they would defend him against his critics, the simple
fact of the matter was that some of the criticism hit too close to home. Curley' s
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brutish manner and more importantly his obvious corruption were very often a
source of embarrassment. The Kennedys in general tried to distance themselves
from these courser elements of their immigrant background and Kennedy in
particular tried to fashion for himself a campaign style that was more polished and
sophisticated and more representative of the upwardly mobile future of the
immigrant community while still remaining faithful to its roots. The result is a style
that is once open and friendly in a way that the Boston Brahmins could not be as it is
refmed and upright in a way that traditional Boston area politicos like Curley could
not be. Kennedy developed the unique ability of being regal without seeming aloof.
In the larger campaigns, it was of course impossible to bring Kennedy around
door to door to meet personally with all his voters. One such way to achieve similar
results while also conserving the limited energies Kennedy was to concentrate their
prospective targets into a single whole. The Kennedy campaign staff were always
very much alive to the danger of spreading their candidate too thin and wearing him
out midway through the campaign so they sought wherever possible to bring
together potential voters into groups. One such way would later go on to be a
standard feature of any future Kennedy campaign, the famous Kennedy tea parties.
Aide to President Kennedy, Kenneth O'Donnell, explains that in the early part of
the 1946 campaign JFK 's sisters came up with this idea of contacting local women's
groups and encouraging them to sponsor a tea party for JFK where all the local
women could get together, discuss whatever issues they had in mind, and meet with
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the candidate. One of the great advantages to the large size of the Kennedy family
was the great resource of dedicated and talented support they could provide. It has
already been noted how instrumental the patriarch, Joseph, was to Jack's campaign
and we shall look more into the crucial role played by the brothers, particularly
Robert, but the Kennedy women, who actually out-numbered the m en , would prove
a veritable force in all the Kennedy campaigns. Rose and the sisters, could arrange
three or four of these tea parties to be staggered throughout the night and would do
this for a number of nights each week. JFK would make his arrival, meet the ladies
and carry on some discussion with them, and be gone in no more than an half an
hour to move on to the next party, leaving a Kennedy woman to stay behind just as
she had been there in advance to attend to the details. Many of JFK 1 s aids thought
that a tea party in the largely working class neighborhoods that made up Boston
would seem "highfalutin" and thus a bad idea but the Kennedy women convinced
them otherwise. They were able, consequently, to cultivate around Kennedy and
the Kennedy family an aura of style and sophistication to which many women of the
rising lower and middle classes sought to aspire. Issu es, of course, may have been
the topic of discussion but many a keen eye was also focused on what the Kennedys
were wearing and how they were behaving.
In the tight race of the 1952 senatorial campaign against the highly polished

and much respected Henry Cabot Lodge, the social graces figured prominently since
Lodge represented the prominent Boston Anglo-Saxons, often referred to as
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Brahmins, who for many were the very image of propriety and style. The tea parties
helped establish the Kennedys as a new source for social r espectability leading some
to say upon JFK's victory over Lodge that the Kennedys were the new Brahmins.
[12] The Kennedy women were also quick to point out that JFK ' s narrow margin of
victory in that race, some seventy thousand votes, was exactly the number of
women who were brought together by the tea parties.
There was another crucial event of the Kennedy campaign against Lodge that
would serve him greatly in his future endeavors, particularly against Richard Nixon.
As has already been noted, Lodge was a greatly respected politician who was
considered by many to be an imposing figure of authority in comparison to the
youthful and inexperienced Kennedy. Many thought that a debate between the two
would highlight this contrast so Lodge was quick to accept when a debate was
proposed in October, 1952. Kennedy performed magnificently showing a great
command of statistics that would become a trademark of his debating and oratorical
style while also further developing his wit. In one quick night before television
cameras and radio microphones, Kennedy was able to establish himself to the voting
public as Lodge's equal in expertise and ability while also showing none of the
condescension that his rival was apt to display. [13] It was a turning point in the
campaign.
The final and perhaps most crucial development in the Kennedy campaign
staff that took place during the 195 2 senatorial campaign was the addition of brother
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Robert to the staff as campaign manager. As late as the spring of 1952, according to
aide Kenneth O'Donnell, the much-touted Kennedy campaign machine was
completely floundering. Despite having amassed a tremendous file of names of
leading politicos throughout Massachusetts, nothing had been done to set up an
organization and no local managers, or "secretaries" as the Kennedy organization
liked to call them, had been chosen since JFK himself had made no decisions on these
matters and had not delegated the authority to do so. To make things worse Joseph
Kennedy, amidst all the confusion, was working behind the scenes to take over the
campaign and put it in the hands of some of his friends amongst the Old Guard
Democrats, something which JFK did not want. Kennedy, however, seemed
oblivious and no one on his campaign staff was able to get across to him the sense of
urgency concerning the poor state of his campaign.

In frustration, O'Donnell decided to call on Robert who at the time was still
working at the Justice Department. Robert's initial reaction was to keep out of any
argument between his brother and his father. "Don't drag me into it," was his
response to O'Donnell. After imparting to him the dire straights his brother's
campaign was in and giving him a sense of its impending disaster, Robert quickly
became interested and promised to intervene between his father and his brother by
calling Joseph Kennedy. Not long after this, Robert called O'Donnell from a tea
party in Quincy, Massachusetts, interrupting O'Donnell's golf game saying: "there
you are playing golf. . .and I'm here with a couple of thousand women in Quincy ,
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thanks to you. I hope you're satisfied. Get down here right away. I want you to tell
Jack some of that stuff you've been telling me."
JFK was furious with O'Donnell for telling his brother and ultimately his
father about the sorry state of his campaign, but it was the opinion of many on his
campaign staff that it was Robert who, upon coming in and taking over as campaign
manager, saved his election bid in 1952. While JFK showed a complete dedication
before the public, RFK showed an equal dedication behind the scenes making sure
that all the details were attended to and taking care of the difficult or dirty jobs that
no one else would address.
Robert could be ruthless in his dedication to his brother. For instance in that
195 2 campaign then Democratic governor of Massachusetts and head of the state's
party, Paul Dever, had initially requested separate campaign staffs everywhere in the
state except for Boston because he thought Kennedy' s chances against Lodge were
unlikely given the impending shift to Republicanism under Eisenhower. He then
changed his mind when his own re-election seemed less certain and Kennedy' s
chances much better. It was Robert who steadfastly refused his Democratic party
leader's request. Dever had some choice words to say of Robert during that incident
and soon after called Joseph to caution him to never allow his son Robert, "the brat",
to call him again--Dever went on to lose the governorship that year. This is but one
example of what would be Robert's growing reputation as a political pit bull for his
brother(14]. It is worth noting that in this example, as would often be the case, it
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was Robert who the injured party blamed and not John. Believing that it was Robert
who was acting on his own volition and exuberance for the cause, Dever never
blamed JFK; this, of course, was in a strict sense the case but Robert was always
acting with his brother's tacit support and approval.
After winning the Massachusetts seat in the Senate in 1952, the next big step
of the Kennedy campaign organization in its ultimate bid for the presidency was,
ironically, experiencing its first loss. Coming into the Democratic National
Convention in 1956, Kennedy had quite by accident gotten himself embroiled in an
intra-party over control of the state organization with the leader of the Massachusetts
Dem ocratic Party and one of the Democrat's most prominent national figures, John
McCormack. Kennedy did so against the advice of his father (this was already
becoming a trend) who cautioned him not to get "into the gutter with those bums."
But this hard fought battle for political control of his own state has been described as
his coming of age as a politician [1 5] and set the stage for Kennedy to head to the
Democratic National Convention in Chicago as the leader of the Massachusetts
delegation. Otherwise, Kennedy would have been just another delegate on the
floor. As it was, Kennedy came to represent a new figure of stature in the party
because he had beaten the Old Guard's McCormack. This, in addition to the fact
that his victory in 195 2 was one of the few successes of the Democratic Party that
year, made Kennedy stand out and thus he was sought after as a speaker.
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When Stevenson threw open the nomination for the vice president to the
floor of the convention, Kennedy and his staff saw an opportunity and at the last
minute the Kennedy for Vice President campaign was put into motion. Once again
against the advice of his father, Kennedy and his staff began working the floor to get
his nomination and only narrowly missed succeeding. In retrospect, JPK was right.
Sharing the ticket in what was a losing campaign could have spelled the end for
Kennedy, but getting his feet wet was probably worth the risk. Not that Kennedy
was working for anything less than victory; Kennedy really wanted the vice
presidential nomination and was bitterly disappointed when he lost it. But, as it
worked out, Kennedy needed to get some experience in the workings of national
politics and the nominating process, and this was a crucial learning experience for

him and one that would serve him well at the next convention in 1960. It was the
luckiest loss of his career.
Another loss also served to help the future Kennedy presidential campaign.
By nearly all accounts, Stevenson's 1956 presidential campaign was an absolute
failure, but there to watch the whole thing unfold was Robert Kennedy who was
engaged by Stevenson as an aide. No one on the campaign staff has any vivid
recollections of Robert as he did not make his presence strongly felt. From the
background, Robert Kennedy managed to record, as he would refer to it later, a
virtual blue-print of how not to run a campaign. [16] By 1956, JFK and his staff
were already thinking ahead to the presidential election of 1960.
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Shortly after the convention, Kennedy would add to his staff speech writer
Theodore Sorensen and pollster Lou Harris. By 1957, Kennedy was already touring
the nation in a whirlwind series of speaking engagements with Sorensen. The final
crucial addition to the still-secret Kennedy for President Campaign was Pierre
Salinger in 1959 who would serve as press coordinator.
Thus was born through a conglomeration of tireless ambition, idealism,
wealth, circumstance, calculation and determination, as well as fortune and dumb
luck, the political career of John F. Kennedy. By 1959, it was poised to attack the
summit of American politics. Everything by 1959 was in place. All that was
necessary was to begin.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Cand idate

The presidential campaign begins
On October 28, 1959, the last and most important of two organizational
meetings for the upcoming Kennedy campaign took place in Hyannis, Massachusetts.
ln attendance were, among others: Robert Kennedy, Steven Smith, Lou Harris,

Kenneth O'Donnel, Ted Sorensen, Ted Kennedy, and Pierre Salinger . As Theodore
White so aptly points out in his history of this campaign, it is the campaign staff of
this and a few other candidates, a handful of men, that work out amongst themselves
what will be the main issues of the coming ten or so months of the campaign season.
While most Americans are innocently and unawaredly going about their business and
attending to their immediate concerns, these men are hard at work trying to set up in
advance the issues that will dominate the minds of Americans in the ensuing few
months. [17] Their effective use of the media will determine whether their work is a
success or a failure.
The two main issues that the campaign staff singled out in this advance
meeting were Kennedy's religion and his age. The country had never before elected
a Catholic as president of the United States and the stinging defeat of candidate Al
Smith, who was the first Catholic to run for that office in 1928, was still fresh in the
minds of many. Also, JFK was potentially the youngest successful candidate in U.S.
history--Theodore Roosevelt was actually younger than Kennedy when he first
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assumed the office of the presidency in 1901 but he did so not as a candidate but as
the next in line after the assassination of McKinley.
These were the two issues which the Kennedy campaign had to get firmly in
hand and shape to their candidate's advantage if there was to be any hope of success
in the 1960 election. Much of the subsequent rhetoric that came out of the Kennedy
campaign was shaped around these issues. The focus on the New Generation and the
New Frontier as themes in the election was, as we shall see, an intelligent turning of
the youth issue to the advantage of the Kennedy campaign. In an America that was
coming into its own after World War II, one that was moving from the cities to the
suburbs, and one that saw the biggest increase in birth rate in its history, Kennedy ' s
youthful aura was really more of a positive factor that a negative one. Also the issue
of religion, in a nation that was striving to move beyond the divisions of its past in
order to assume its new position as leader of the free world, became something of a
litmus test to the free thinking and tolerance of the American people, due in no small
part to the work of the Kennedy campaign. A strong theme in American politics and
culture during the 1950s which really came into fruition during the 1960s was a new
vision of American citizenship independent of any racial or religious background.
Whereas in the past the identity of American citizenship was strongly rooted within
the Anglo-Protestant cultural tradition, America, primarily through the work of the
Supreme Court, but also as a result of changing demographics and world conditions,
began to view citizenship through the prism of legal definitions that worked to
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obviate cultural distinctions--these legal definitions were increasingly formulated in
the later twentieth century under the premise that cultural values should be excluded
from all examinations of the rights of American citizens. Kennedy was, of course,
quick to use this trend to his advantage by constantly stressing the separation
between his personal and public self through his calling upon constitutional rights
guaranteed him as a citizen. While Kennedy and many other Americans could point
to their passport as a possible affirmation of their status as U. S. citizens, these legal
defmitions of citizenship were earlier in the century less compelling than the cultural
definitions which were then more dominant. You could be a bona fide U.S. citizen
on paper, but that did not necessarily make you as much of a citizen as some others at
least with respect to having the privilege to be able hold positions of power and
esteem in society. Kennedy' s arguments mirrored those of other backgrounds like
many leaders in the civil rights movement who sought to use the tremendous amount
of pride Anglo-Saxons took in the systems of jurisprudence as a means of claiming
their own rights as citizens under the law. With respect to Kennedy and his Catholic
background many American Protestants took exception to his using their own beliefs
against them--at least King was a Protestant and believed like they do but a Catholic
claiming rights which his own faith had originally (and in many cases still) denied
Protestants, that was too much--but we will get to that later.
Though the Kennedy staff were quick to recognize the potential advantages of
these two crucial issues of youth and enlightened tolerance, it would take time for
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them to work out how they would use these issues as themes within the Kennedy
campaign. To refine somewhat Theodore White's observation mentioned earlier,
although a few men would set the agenda of the great discourse that is an American
presidential election, they would do so in conjunction with the population of the
nation. Ultimately, the process resembles something of a controlled dialogue
between the campaign staff and the nation through the auspices of the media with
each theme and idea put forth by the staff constantly remolded in response to the
reactions of the voting audience.

Ke nne dy o ffi c ially announces his candid acy .
On Saturday, January 2, 1960, John Fitzgerald Kennedy spoke in front of a
crowded press conference declaring his candidacy for the presidency of the United
States. Although Kennedy had been speaking for some time to audiences across the
country under the assumption of his running in 1960, this was his first open
declaration as a candidate and consequently it was critically important in setting the
tone for the coming election.
Just as had been foreseen at the meeting in Hyannis some months before, the
main questions posed to him at that press conference concerned his age and his
religion. It is not an issue of doubt whether or not Kennedy had built up for himself
a first-rate staff of campaign ad visors. They were a capable group of men and their
advice would serve him well throughout the campaign. But at this moment Kennedy
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would stand alone and face the crowd. All the voters could see before them was the
candidate and even though any presidency is a group effort, it would be upon their
perceptions of that one candidate that voters would make their decision in the
upcoming election. Whatever the work that goes into a campaign and as critical and
necessary as it may be, it is the candidate who stands before the nation and faces the
grueling ordeal of their decision. In this way, it really is a proving ground for
elective office in the sense that any person who shows the stamina and the leadership
to successfully carry himself through such a trial clearly possesses some of the
attributes necessary to qualify him for political leadership.
JFK on January 2, 1960 stood on the verge of a precipice the depth and size of
which he could not possibly have known. Though he had faced campaigns before
there can be nothing to compare with a campaign for the presidency of the United
States, especially at this point in its history where the stakes for the future of the
nation and the world in general were so high. This ceremony perhaps may have
seemed to him something like the declaration of a suitor his intention to marry the
prettiest and most wealthy girl in town and although Kennedy' s dedication to
wedding vows has been openly questioned, it seems certain that he took this vow
very seriously and was determined to win this girl's hand over her host of rival
suitors. At least so it seemed in the forceful and forthright manner in which
Kennedy made his entrance onto the presidential scene on that day in 1960. At his
press conference Kennedy stressed two points. First, that he would not accept under
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any circumstances the nomination of his party for the office of vice president. It was
all or nothing at all. And second, he openly challenged his rival Democratic
contenders to meet him on the campaign fields in the primaries; this issue could not
properly be settled in the back room of the convention but only in open combat. At
precisely 12: 30 pm as Kennedy walked to the podium to declare his candidacy, he
stood for a moment and peered over the edge of that precipice. It would be for him
either the beginning or the end, but if Kennedy was uncertain about his future, he
did not show it. In the words of Ted Sorenson who was there to witness it: "He was
not only crisp but confident."[18)
The statement r egarding the position of vice president was a sensible one. If
he did not rule out quickly the possibility of accepting the vice presidency, he would
most certainly have been maneuvered into taking that position. His adversaries,
despite his popularity, did not take his campaign very seriously. In their minds, the
issue of religion was enough to disqualify him but on top of that Kennedy had almost
no political clout. He was close to none of the big power brokers in Washington and
did not enjoy the backing of any powerful figures in the Democratic Party. It was for
this reason, beyond the more romantic one cited before, that Kennedy was pledging
himself to fight in as many primaries as he possibly could. O nly through
incontrovertible public support could he hope to win the Democratic nomination.
Consequently, because of the unlikely chances of a Catholic gaining so much popular
support, many of Kennedy' s opponents thought they could bring him aboard their
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ticket as a vice presidential nominee; a Catholic vice presidential nominee was
generally thought to be a strength, while a Catholic heading the ticket was not only a
weakness but was unthinkable.
It is probably hard to imagine in this day and age, but the issue of Catholicism

and democracy is a long and drawn-out one. Now, democracy tends to be seen in
secular terms but for most of its history in modem Europe and North America it was
decidedly a religious issue. Kennedy, of course, made the point that his private faith
had no bearing on his public rights and duties. To the question posed to him at this
press conference concerning his religion, Kennedy stated:
I would think that there is really only one issue involved in the whole question

ef a

candidate's reliaion--that is, does a candidate believe in the Constitution, does he
believe in the First Amendment, does he believe in the separation

ef church and state.

When the candidate aives his views on that question and I think I have Biven my views
fully, I think the subject is exhausted.[ 19]

His main argument focused on the issue of the separation of church and state which
was a very clever way of framing the argument.
The main rationale for the separation of church and state as it was
incorporated into the Constitution was to keep religious authority from establishing
itself in government. Just after the Revolution, there were a number of competing
religions in the United States. Each was concerned that the other might seek to
establish itself as the official religion in the new nation just as Anglicanism had
established itself in England. The separation of church and state was, therefore, a
guarantee of religious freedom, but it was a guarantee with a specific purpose in
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mind and was consequently limited in scope as a protection of Protestant religious
freedom. In the minds of most democratic thinkers both in the United States and in
Europe, the concepts of political freedom were centered in their religious thoughts.
A freeman was generally seen within the Protestant context as one free to
contemplate his Lord God, Jesus Christ and by so doing to come upon Truth.
Modern democracy was predominantly founded in the theological principle that each
man is an individual and therefore capable of contemplating and understanding God
without the interference of any earthly authority.
The theology of Catholicism is directly counter to this and was therefore
throughout democracy's early history in Western Europe and North America its
most bitter opponent. The very principles that this nation was founded upon were
largely in reaction to these hierarchical concepts of Catholic theology.
Consequently, although the separation of church and state was most immediately
concerned with maintaining a balance between Protestant faiths, its main goal, and
one on which all the Protestant faiths could agree, was to prevent the consolidation
of religious and political power which they all feared and which was always
associated with Catholicism and Catholic beliefs. Democracy and Protestantism,
except among the most radical of thinkers (who were either deists or irreligious and
even they could agree that among Christian religions Catholicism was the worst),
were synonymous. To the minds of most of the men who formulated the concepts
of democracy both here and in Europe, the Catholic mind was simply incapable of
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grasping the meaning of democracy as its very theology is counter to it [20]. Even as
the fear of Catholicism diminished and Catholics became a significant portion of the
American population, it was still widely believed that Catholics still had to be closely
watched over lest their theological tendencies to submit unquestioningly to authority
were to get the best of them and democracy become jeopardized. as m entioned
before, Kennedy in framing the argument in this way as an issue of the separation of
church and state was essentially using Protestant theology against itself. These
attitudes toward Catholicism may seem decidedly nineteenth century but
eventhough much had changed during the twentieth century these fundamental
beliefs remained strong.
In the aftermath of World War II, however, the Protestant principles which
were for so long the foundation for this nation became more open to question. The
greatest peril facing the principles of democracy and Protestantism was no longer
Catholic absolutism, but rather communist totalitarianism. The challenge became to
move the concept of freedom outside of its religious context and place it within a
humanist one. It is fortunate that the Constitution was largely framed by some of the
more radical American revolutionary leaders and that they were able to put within
the Constitution a humanist language that, although probably not shared by most of
their contemporaries, fit so well for the America of the Cold War period. It should
be noted at the risk of repetition that this secular humanist concept of individuality
and freedom was not a new one in the middle of the twentieth century. It had been
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in currency in America for some two hundred years and there were strong humanist
elements in Protestant theology and even in some Catholic ideology. Therefore it
was not its novelty that made it noteworthy or even its common usage, but instead it
is noteworthy because it became the centerpiece of how America represented itself
in this era eclipsing other previously dominant themes.
Kennedy at this time in 1960 was able therefore to bring up the persuasive
argument that his personal beliefs concerning religion were of no consequence to his
ability to run this nation and that his public life was separate from his private beliefs.
It is not that those Protestants who thought twice about a Catholic running a nation
which they thought to be a product of their Protestant heritage were right or wrong
about their convictions, but instead that this concern was quickly becoming
irrelevant and if Protestant Americans were not able to move beyond it they were in
danger of becoming obsolete--the fate of the British Empire could not have been far
from their minds and have given them serious pause over any old concepts of
Anglo-Protestant superiority they still entertained. Kennedy knew that democracy
to be successful in the new Cold War period in a world that was predominantly
non-Christian would have to be formulated on secular grounds disregarding religious
concerns. The irony of this situation was that even as the Cold War became a
struggle against the "Godless" communists by the "God fearing'' people of the free
world, this could only be achieved by watering down the concept of God so that it
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could embrace all faiths and function largely as a symbol in an increasingly secular
environment.
It is interesting to note as an aside how this development would create
something of a dilemma within the modern presidency. Ultimately, Kennedy' s
argument would have to rest on a premise of expediency with respect to the
workings of government; that the real test of a man's worthiness to hold public
office was to be found in his ability to perform his tasks and not in his private
convictions. Kennedy often stated that he maintained the principles of his Catholic
faith and still took them seriously. If this were true than he would have to look upon
the position of the presidency as a job, a very important one no doubt but
nevertheless a job, one that he wanted and felt he was no less qualified for than
anyone else but one with no decisive bearing on any eternal issues. Within that
context, his performance in the job could only be judged by success or failure based
on temporal and shifting issues; overarching moral issues tend to be obscured or
become deceptive. The premise of secular humanism was for Kennedy as perplexing
as it was for Protestants since, although sensible, it is in fact irreconcilable with all
traditional forms of Christianity. Pure secular humanism is an ancient philosophy
which owes its foundation to a form of thought that is diametrically opposed to the
concept of religion, unless of course religion is so watered down that it becomes
completely innocuous and interchangeable one for the other, and rests upon the
precept that the dignity of man is self-generated. It places man at the center of all
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things. One does not doubt that Kennedy was true to his word when he pledged his
belief in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the separation of church and state
but his motive in doing so would have to be, barring a complete duplicity on his
avowed maintenance of his faith, one based solely on expedience and not on any true
belief since without the investment of Divine inspiration into the British
parliamentary style of government that most dominant Protestant faiths worked into
their theology or the central belief in the sanctity of human ideas prevalent in
humanism, these documents become nothing more than negotiable codes of
behavior.
None of these principles are at all sacrosanct within the context of Catholic
theology and therefore on a moral plain they become deceptive--i.e. Kennedy
pledges his support for the Constitution and swears to uphold it not because he really
believes in it, at least not in the manner many Protestants had been raised to believe
in it or humanists have chosen to believe in it, but rather because it would be foolish
not to. The Constitution is protected by him, true, but only as a necessary and
convenient tool of government and in this sense it becomes an expedient and a
somewhat morally compromised document. It is probable that Kennedy did not
unduly tax himself over this issue as he campaigned for the presidency thinking
perhaps that it would resolve itself with time. Nevertheless it remains a perplexing
issue.
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Nor is it true that these problems arose with Kennedy; they were in the
making for some time but the Cold War served as a means to push the process
forward and ultimately sever American government from its Protestant assumptions
of the nineteenth century. At the time of Theodore Roosevelt, a president could
believe confidently that his faith and his role as president were singular and that, in
fact, the very workings of government itself were somehow evidence of God's plan
made manifest on earth and he as president was acting on God 's behalf. This form of
Protestant Progressivism was dominant in America all through the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries and John Foster Dulles in the Eisenhower administration
was a remaining vestige of this belief during the 1950s. All the presidents up to
Herbert Hoover with few notable exceptions are fairly easy to understand because of
this ready association of God in their public life. By 1960, with John F. Kennedy it
seemed that God and morality would become more private concerns and the
activities of the president would be judged primarily on strictly legal terms.
Leaving aside the persuasiveness of his argument that he was a private citizen
pursuing his lawfully guaranteed rights as a citizen, Kennedy left the podium that day
in Washington with his audience still unconvinced. As is so often the case,
Americans were to make their decision based more on the passionate exchanges on
the campaign trail and less on the strength of the candidate's logic. The course of
the campaign over the ensuing nine months would provide Kennedy the opportunity
to prove to the American public that a young and Catholic man had the capacity and
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the right to be president. Kennedy's opponents, however, were even more doubtful
of the chances for a successful Kennedy campaign. Only the dark horse candidate,
Hubert Humphrey, was pledged to go out and enter the primaries against Kennedy.
Stuart Symington, the senator from Missouri, and Lyndon Johnson, the Senate
Majority leader from Texas, both thought it wise to sit out the primaries and take the
nomination in what they thought was sure to be a deadlocked convention in Los
Angeles. Adlai Stevenson, the two-time Democratic nominee, awaited a draft
Stevenson movement to ride him into his third nomination.

Wisconsin
The first test would be the Wisconsin primary on April 15. Wisconsin
bordered Humphrey's home state of Minnesota and would be a crucial victory to
show Kennedy's strength outside the Northeast. Also, Wisconsin provided a
favorable balance with which Kennedy could test his appeal among rural Protestant
Americans. There is in Wisconsin a sizable rural population yet it has as well in
Milwaukee and Madison a substantial urban population. Also with a Catholic
population of between 30 and 40 percent, Wisconsin could provide for Kennedy a
nice challenge in his vote-getting appeal among Protestants while still being able to
rely upon a safe cushion of Catholic support. Kennedy and his staff knew that, on the
one hand, a defeat in Wisconsin would be the end of his campaign but, on the other
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hand, a significant victory could wrap up the nomination. Consequently, Kennedy
and his team pulled out all the stops for a decisive victory over Humphrey.
It is interesting to note, as a contrast, how Humphrey saw this campaign
against Kennedy and what he thought the election of 1960 was all about. Humphrey
was a well respected senator from Minnesota and had built a strong reputation for
himself as a fervent supporter of liberal ideals in the Democratic Party; he was firmly
behind the cause of civil rights long before Kennedy was, for example. Humphrey's
rise to political power was in many ways a confirmation of the populist ideals that
had long been the foundation of the Democratic Party but in the era big business and
big labor had fallen somewhat by the wayside. Humphrey was very much a man of
the people and tried wherever possible to cast himself as being one of them, which to
a large degree was completely natural because he really was. His language was plain
and although Humphrey's candor was refreshing in comparison to Kennedy's,
chronicler of the 1960 campaign Theodore White was quite right in pointing out the
dubious nature of the sobriquet "man of the people" in presidential politics:
Humphrey was "someone just like the listeners" but "a President, unfortunately for
Humphrey, must be different from everyone else. "[21]

In a speech to a Jewish group in Milwaukee, Humphrey summed up his views
on liberalism and the Cold War:
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We believe liberalism is more than intellectual capacity--intellectual liberalism must be

ef

ef

buttressed with an understandin9 people and a love them that 9oesJar beyond texts
or documents. For you can't cry a little bit in politics, the only other thin9you'11
have is hate.

if

It is difficult to imagine Kennedy crying at all let alone crying in a political situation.
Humphrey goes on:

The real contest in this world is not a military one; our real competition with the
Soviet Union is not an economic one ... lt is a coriflict over a system

ef

ef values ... To elect a

ef

President it's more important that he be 9ood heart, 9ood spirit, than that he be
slick, or clever, or statesmanlike-lookin9. To be a leader means a willin9ness to
risk--and a willin9ness to love. Has the leader 9iven you somethin9 directlyfrom his
heart? Or has it all been planned in advance, all been scheduled? Is it efficient? you
want efficiency in politics, you can 90 to the communists or totalitarians. I believe

!J

politics is simply to deal with people and to be human. Every now and then I read in
the paper how disorderly Hubert Humphrey's campai9n is and I say, THANK GOD.
[22]

Humphrey uses the word liberalism but what he really seems to be referring to is
populism. These terms are often used interchangeably and like the terms liberal and
conservative are difficult to pin down over various historical eras. However, it could
be said that liberalism from its origins in the Enlightenment period had always been
something of an elitist and intellectual term, while the words Humphrey uses here
really are more apropos of Populism as it originated in the American Midwest during
the later half of the nineteenth century--one has to wonder whether Humphrey is just
inadvertently mixing his terminology or whether, perhaps, he was just reticent to use
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so late in the twentieth century the word populism. Whatever terms one chooses to
use in describing this form of rhetoric, it would take the Vietnam war and W atergate
to make humility an appealing trait in a presidential candidate and then only for
Jimmy Carter in 1976 and not for Jimmy Carter in 1980.
Here in these brief statements we can see how Humphrey tried to stack up
what were his strengths against what he saw as Kennedy' s weaknesses, his open
candor and his love for the people against Kennedy' s clever wit, regal style, and
money. Throughout the Wisconsin campaign Humphrey talked about saving the
disappearing small business man and farmer and preserving the vital force in
American culture that they represent while Kennedy would go on about statistics and
the coming of a new era, almost eager to leave the old one behind. In this day of
corporate farms and Sup er Walmarts reading Humphrey's words makes them seem
both more prophetic and more sad. Humphrey, himself, said at one point that he felt
like "a corner grocer running against a chain store." [23) It seems Americans have
made their decision and voted for efficiency and style and listening to Humphrey,
one has to wonder if they made the right choice.
Of Wisconsin's thirty-one delegates, ten were chosen on a state wide
winner -takes-all basis, twenty were chosen, two each, from the state's ten
Congressional districts, and the remaining vote was split between the national
committeeman and committeewoman. Crossover voting was allowed between the
Republicans and Democrats.
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Lou Harris conducted a poll for the Kennedy campaign of some twenty-three
thousand voters in Wisconsin. At that time the biggest campaign poll ever taken
within a state, the poll showed Kennedy' s weak areas in the third, the ninth, and the
tenth districts bordering on Minnesota (which were also heavily Protestant) and what
would be for Kennedy the crucial religiously mixed districts of the first and second
districts.
Both candidates spent about the same amount of money in Wisconsin, some
$ 150,000 [24), but Humphrey's Minnesota team of volunteers were part time and
were only available on weekends while Kennedy' s staff was full time and was also
able to open up headquarters in each congressional district while. Humphrey was
limited to Madison and Milwaukee. Humphrey relied mainly on the clout he was
able to establish for himself over the years in the Wisconsin State Democratic
Organization.
In addition to his staff, which with the exception of Ted Sorensen, had all
moved to Wisconsin for the primary, there was of course the Kennedy family. The
Kennedy family stumped tirelessly throughout Wisconsin and many Wisconsiners
were often confused into thinking that one of the Kennedy brothers to whom they
were listening was actually JFK, when it was, in reality, either Robert or Teddy and
JFK was speaking miles away. These reports would get back to Humphrey and cause
him much consternation as JFK seemed to be everywhere simultaneously and he,
being a mere mortal, could only be in one place at any given time. [25]
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The press was also much impressed with the Kennedy campaign organization
and, setting the precedent for a phenomenon which would reoccur throughout the
coming months of the campaign, began to favor him. Reports began to circulate that
Kennedy would sweep all of Wisconsin's ten congressional districts and that, at least,
a significant Kennedy victory was certain. [26] This effect of the Kennedy campaign
in biasing the news media was subtle and no doubt was the result more of an
unconscious rather than conscious and deliberate decisions on the part of the press.
All news media are careful to maintain the appearance of objectivity in their
coverage of the candidates; to appear obviously biased is simply embarrassing for any
mainstream reporter and news outlet. Bias in the print media more often takes the
form of the quantity and the quality of the press coverage. For instance, the national
magazine U.S. News and World Report ran a full-length cover story on the Kennedy
election team by reporter Ben Bradley. Here in particular the quality of the coverage
comes across. In describing that October, 1959, first meeting of the Kennedy
election team discussed earlier, Bradley brought out all the various personalities.
We learn the names of the staff members and family members. Bradley described a
collegial and friendly atmosphere "Distant from the smoke filled rooms of a political
convention."[27] To be fair to Bradley and the other reporters, the Kennedy staff
were really a journalist's dream. They were all engaging with interesting
backgrounds and of course there is the tremendous human interest aspect of the
Kennedy family--it all made for simply fabulous copy that probably wrote itself.
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Nonetheless, the type of words Bradley chose to use were very evocative and
reflective of general trends in the manner in which Kennedy was approached by the
media. Bradley wrote: "Shrewd judgment, boyish charm, plenty of money--all of
these have played their part in bringing John Kennedy close to the Democratic
nomination"(28] This particular article was written after the Wisconsin primary but
there is evident in it some of the buzz words and catch phrases that were circulating
around Kennedy. Reporters tend to use each others wor ds in their copy; the proof
of this is that thirty years later these same words are just as likely to be used by a
journalist in reference to Kennedy as they were then by Bradley--they have become
convenient copy or Kennedy cliches.
Sometimes it is not even the words alone but mere word order that can also
reflect bias. A reporter less favorable to Kennedy could have easily written the same
lines using the same words and made it less positive by simply inverting the order of
the words and starting the sentence with "lots of money." As it is now the money is
just the icing on the cake. The delicate issue of Kennedy' s father was also
sidestepped by Bradley, In general throughout the media, potential problem topics
for the Kennedy campaign (outside of his youth and religion and those more often
than not were either neutralized by being labeled as illegitimate criticisms or turned
into positives by stressing his "boyish charm" or the importance of tolerance as a
virtue) seemed to be glossed over.
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There are a number of other subtle ways that journalistic copy can reflect
bias. Bradley goes on in this particular article about the Kennedy campaign team to
describe the staff as "a big, smooth, hard-hitting political organization."[29] Again by
the time this article was written, June 27, 1960, this had become a very familiar tag
placed on the Kennedy election team and even during the Wisconsin primary local
reporters were frequently referring to Kennedy' s campaign as a "huge, smooth
running"[30] organization. Humphrey tried during the Wisconsin campaign to turn
that tag to his favor by making Kennedy ' s efficiency seem sinister and "all planned
out" but it was to no avail. In the consumer culture that we had become by the
beginning of the sixties efficiency and power were dominant themes over lovability
and folksiness. Actually, Bradley's copy sounds very much like advertising copy. If
one were to change the final two words of his sentence, for instance, from "political
organization" to "luxury-performance car," there would be evident the familiar
phrasing of an automobile advertisement. In that line of thinking, would any
consumer choose a familiar but inefficient car over a "big, smooth, hard hitting" one?
Simply put, the Kennedy campaign was able to fashion around Kennedy the
aura of a winner which consequently gave his words more impact and made them
more interesting to the reporters who covered them than did the words of
Humphrey. The Kennedy campaign was able to exploit to a new level of efficiency
the old adage: it is not so much what you say as how you say it. To this could also
be added the importance of who says it. Reporters need interesting stories about
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interesting people and in the press what makes a subject interesting is how it is
presented and who presents it; in what was at the time the rapidly growing field of
television this, of course, became an even more important factor raising the
significance of who was talking to still higher levels of importance.
The Kennedy campaign was also very much aware of the reporters following
their campaign as human beings and often went out of its way to cater to their needs.
Humphrey's campaign was not indifferent to the importance of reporters but they, as
was traditional in political campaigning at the time, sought more the approval of the
editors and looked on the reporters as simply a conduit to the masses whose personal
favor was not in need of being won over. Kennedy and his campaign staff sought as
much as possible to include the reporters covering them into their campaign and
eventually had the effect of psychologically bringing them on board as if they were
part of the campaign. This was a tremendous advantage and would pay even greater
dividends in the coming campaign against Richard Nixon.
As far as an awareness of the crucial role of the media in campaign strategy
Wisconsin was just the beginning in a Kennedy campaign that would set the trend for
what would become standard media practices. The Kennedy staff tried whenever
possible to bring the immediacy of their candidate to the American people believing
the personal charisma of Kennedy was one of his main attributes. With this in mind,
they arranged for a two-channel telephone car to be placed in all motorcades directly
behind the candidate allowing reporters to file running accounts to their offices of
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the receptions the candidate was receiving while the parades were in progress [31]
Actually, this is a brilliant idea beyond the level of its technical efficiency because
reports written in the midst of a crowd frenzy are more likely to reflect the emotion
of the event than if they are written later in the quiet of a hotel room or office.
The Kennedy staff also worked up what was at that time the technical and
administrative innovation of the instant transcript. At each and every speech, a
Kennedy staffer would perch himself somewhere in the audience, often times in
precarious situations, with his stenograph machine and take down, word for word,
Kennedy's speeches and remarks. He would, as he was in progress, pass over his
notations to fellow staffers who would ferry them immediately over to some
temporary location where they had installed a mimeograph machine. The transcripts
were then copied, collated, and distributed to the press. All of this was part and
parcel of what chief Kennedy Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, called their
overarching strategy of making the job of the press as easy as possible.[32] In this
case, providing transcripts for the press was an effective weapon in that strategy .
Having ready-made transcripts available freed the individual reporters to take in the
atmosphere of a Kennedy rally and to be caught up in the emotions of the crowd. It
also endeared Kennedy to the reporters since it liberated them from yet another
chore of their profession and it is certain that more than one unfortunate, or perhaps
delinquent, reporter relied on those transcripts to file a report on a speech which he
was not in attendance to hear. But perhaps even more importantly it ensured that
52

Bryan Wutbrich
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960

the off the cuff remarks which made Kennedy' s speeches so engaging to the audience
were also included in the printed press reports read by millions of other Americans
thereby allowing, in some small way, the print media to capture that same sense of
spontaneity which Kennedy was so successfully able to get across in the broadcast
media.
The degree of media savviness in the Kennedy campaign was truly a first in
American politics. They paid attention to and were familiar with every aspect of the
media process in news gathering and news reporting. The Kennedy staff were often
ahead of their time when it cam e to media techniques and, for example, actually
made arrangem ents for all of Kennedy' s major rallies to be recorded by the nascent
mobile video tape units. Much of this can be attributed to Kennedy himself who was
at one time a reporter. He seemed to be genuinely fascinated with media and how it
worked. He was a voracious consumer of the media and was frequently known to
personally call up astonished journalists, even after he became president, to make
comments on their stories. He was also extremely conscious of his image and how it
was portrayed in the media and would constantly seek feedback from his staff
members about how he looked and how he sounded.
More, importantly, however, he seemed to sincerely like reporters and the
jobs they were doing. He made numerous friends in the press corps and was always
sure to make himself available to them. According to Ben Bradley, who would go on
to become the editor of the Washington Post and one of the key men in uncovering
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the Watergate conspiracy under Nixon, Kennedy' s door was always open to the
various reporters who wanted to see him on any given day. Kennedy was personable
and was able to play the role of gracious dignitary giving an all access pass to the
often star struck reporters. His remarks to them usually had an air of spontaneity
giving each reporter the impression that he was gaining valuable insight into Kennedy
the man. Bradley describes the relationship between the press and Kennedy as being
an "elaborate mating dance" [33] that would ultimately blossom into a full-blown
love affair. It is interesting how unapologetic Bradley is about his bias towards
Kennedy. He openly admits to his preferences and even how they affected his copy
and yet feels completely justified in the sense that he truly believes that later on in
the general elections Kennedy was deserving of his support and that Nixon was not.
Implicitly, to the mind of Bradley the nation was better served by this editorial and
opinion-shaping aspect of the press allowing its slight bias to taint its coverage of
these two men. The simple fact of the matter was that to Bradley and many of his
fellow reporters as well Kennedy would make a better president.
Despite the positive coverage in the press, however, the Kennedy campaign
did not achieve a decisive victory in Wisconsin and although they won with a
majority of 56% of the vote, they lost all of the predominantly Protestant border
districts; the third, the ninth, and the tenth districts. Humphrey also won the mixed
second district and Kennedy won by only the narrowest of margins the other mixed
district, the seventh. Kennedy carried all the predominantly Catholic and urban
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districts giving him six to Humphrey's four districts. One of the Kennedy sisters,
somewhat confused over her brother's lack of enthusiasm for his victory, asked him:
"What does it mean?" Kennedy replied: "It means that we have to do it all over
again. We have to go through every one and win every one of them--West Virginia,
Nebraska, Maryland, Indiana, Oregon, all the way to the convention." [34]
The Kennedy campaign in Wisconsin was anything but conclusive on his
ability to be the next president but it was, however, completely conclusive that
Humphrey could not be the next president. Claiming what he perceived as a moral
victory over Kennedy in Wisconsin, Humphrey, upon hearing the returns,
euphorically pledged to the press that he would go on and fight him in West Virginia.
Whatever Humphrey's personal reasons for continuing his campaign, it was clear
that if he could not carry his own border state then he had no chance to win the
election and that his continued campaigning activity had the appearance of being a
pawn in the campaigns of others anxious to derail the Kennedy campaign. The fact
that it was later learned that Humphrey's campaign in West Virginia was largely
financed by Stevenson supporters [35] made it even more suspicious. Kennedy was,
of course, furious that Humphrey planned to oppose him in West Virginia even
though earlier in the race a Lou Harris poll had shown Kennedy with a substantial
lead and the campaign staff had once hoped to "trap" Humphrey there. After
Wisconsin, however, Kennedy was anxious to lock up the primaries and had grown
irritated with what appeared to him to be a stop Kennedy movement.
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Things quickly went from bad to worse when soon after the staff arrived in
West Virginia they learned that the earlier Harris poll showing Kennedy with a
comfortable G0-40 lead was misleading. The poll was conducted some tjme before
the campaign season had begun and apparently without any of the subjects realizing
that Kennedy was Catholic. When, after the hard fought Wisconsin primary, the
religious issue was brought to the fore and it came to the attention of the West
Virginia voters that Kennedy was Catholic, the margin there completely reversed
itself. The new circumstances facing the Kennedy staff were 60-40 for Humphrey.
Things looked very gloomy as the Kem~edy campaign set to work on West Virginia
and it appeared very likely that they ,.,.·ere about to lose and thereby throw open the
convention to what would be almost sure defeat. As it turned out, however, the
over 90% Protestant make up of West Virginia wo-:.1ld provide Kennedy with a
conclusive victory over the religious issue, at least as far as the Democratic
nomination was concerned, and would essentially lock up the nomination. Like the
Democratic convention of 1956, the events leading up to the West Virginia primary
were for Kennedy a series of blessings in disguise.

\Vest Virginia
Among some of the advantages that the Kennedy campaign had at its disposal
was its resourcefol staff, an army of over nine thousand campaign volunteers, and the
abilities of the candidate himself--not to mention the added confidence that an almost
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unlimited resource of funding can bring to a campaign staff, even if as it turns out
they did not greatly out spend Humphrey. All these forces were set into motion to
help· turn the tide for the Kennedy organization. Also, it must be said, there were at
their disposal in West Virginia some illicit and decidedly below the board advantages
as well.
West Virginia was known at the time to be one of the most corrupt states in
the union. Poverty was of course rampant throughout the state and would go on to
be a major campaign issue of the primary. It had been a tradition of long standing
that politicians and government employees in West Virginia would supplement their
meager wages during elections with contributions that were generally regarded as
fees for services provided. Most often the service provided involved placement in
the complicated slate system by which candidates names were organized and
presented to the voter. Voters would vote for an entire slate and inclusion on a well
known slate was critical for any potential candidate, even a presidential one. As a
show of good faith, contributions were often expected by the local parties for
inclusion on their slate. [36) It also has become evident by the release of certain FBI
wiretaps done at the time that large amounts of Mafia donations were made to the
Kennedy campaign and were fmding their way to W est Virginia--Kennedy had just
before the West Virginia primary made the acquaintance of mob boss Sam Giancana
through a mutual friend, Frank Sinatra, and as it turned out a mutual mistress, Judith
Campbell. [37)
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Although these activities do not seem to be widespread enough to indicate
that Kennedy bought the election (according to the Charleston Gazette which put
two of its best reporters on the case to see if that was in fact what happened,
"Kennedy did not buy that election. He sold himself to the voters."), they are
nonetheless unsavory and do not reflect well on Kennedy. In his defense, however,
the journalist Theodore White has argued that corruption was simply a rule of the
game in West Virginia. [38) Also, it should be noted that West Virginia provided
clear evidence of prejudice against Kennedy as the quick turn-around in the polls
showed; Kennedy was losing people's votes in an unfair manner so it probably
seemed less wrong to him and his staff that he should win them back, at least
partially, in an equally unfair manner. In that desperate struggle any and every
advantage had to be utilized, or at least so it would have seemed to the Kennedy
campaign.
Humphrey, himself, was no stranger to this fact as it seems to have played a
role in his choice of music for his campaign song--choosing the tune of"Give Me that
Old Time Religion" could hardly have been a coincidence. As the campaign
progressed Humphrey would attack Kennedy and the Kennedy campaign with
increasing vehemence, at one point saying publicly that "Kennedy is the spoiled
candidate and he and that young, emotional, juvenile Bobby are spending money
with wild abandon."(39] Kennedy, himself, tried as was his custom to remain above
the fray but it seems more than likely that he gave his tacit approval to allow a rather
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unfair remark to be made about Humphrey by Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., who was
campaigning for Kennedy in West Virginia, concerning Humphrey's lack of military
service in W. W .II. The remark was quickly disowned by Kennedy but only after the
damage had already been done. By all accounts, the West Virginia campaign was a
hard fought no-holds-barred battle by both candidates.
The addition of FDR Jr. to the campaign was a defmite stroke of genius and
seems to have been the work of father Joseph. FDR senior was nearly a deity among
the West Virginians who remember fondly his help during their plight of the
depression years. In an exercise of pure irony FDR Jr. campaigned throughout the
state holding his two entwined fingers before the crowd saying "my daddy and
Kennedy's daddy were like this." Letters were also post marked from Hyde Park,
NY, giving support for the Kennedy candidacy signed FDR, as if the old man had
risen from the grave to put his name behind Kennedy. This situation was made even
stranger by the fact that Eleanor Roosevelt was deliberately withholding her support
for Kennedy. Saying she was unimpressed by Kennedy's stand on the McCarthy
issue--Kennedy did not vote to censure McCarthy, who was a family friend, claiming
he was in the hospital at the time when in truth he could have easily voted by
proxy--Mrs. Roosevelt had refused to support Kennedy. She was also concerned
that Kennedy had never dealt satisfactorily with the issue of his Catholicism. [40]
The issue of religion was, of course, the main issue of the campaign in West
Virginia and Mrs. Roosevelt's remarks concerning the manner in which Kennedy
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handled the issue have some pertinence. The truth is that, while Kennedy was very
brave in tackling the issue, he never really dealt squarely with the complexities of
the matter. His tactic, knowingly or unknowingly, was to completely delegitimizc
the issue. He never once dealt with the real differences of opinion concerning the
role of the state and religion that are fundamental to the theology of Catholicism and
Protestantism. Instead he cleverly defused the issue, and actually turned it to his
advantage as discussed before, by making it an issue of tolerance and the separation
of church and state. Framing his argument in this manner, it is not Catholic
tolerance that falls into question but Protestant tolerance. By framing the argument
in this highly charged emotional atmosphere and often boldly pronouncing that no
one asked him what religion he was when he was given command of a PT boat in the
Pacific or what religion his brother was when he died fighting for this country over
Europe, issues of substance became distorted.
It cannot be said that Kennedy was to blame for this or that he was
deliberately trying to put one over on the Protestants. He was only trying to get
elected. Instead, the very means by which this discussion was to be carried almost
necessitated or ordained this type of approach. Presenting one's arguments to a large
crowd either directly or, as is more often the case, through the medium of radio or
television does not allow a full discussion of the facts and issues at hand. Holding the
attention of a large audience is no easy matter requiring large amounts of
simplification (in the case of radio or television time is even more restricted and
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simplification even greater). Facts become less the issue and appearances
preeminent. An issue has to be boiled down to one easily identifiable and easily
circulated aspect. More often than not that aspect has to carry with it some
emotional value that somehow fits in with the mood of the times. Tolerance by the
1960 campaign was the most convenient and usable aspect of the religious issue that
the Kennedy staff had at its disposal and it was one that fit in nicely with the mood of
the times. Tolerance is a worthwhile ideal if it involves a genuine understanding of
the issues that separate any two communities. It can lead to deeper understanding of
the prevalent ties of commonality between them and allow them to see beyond what
they understand to be, in truth, petty differences. At the very least, in the case when
those differences are real and insurmountable tolerance can lead to recognition of the
intractable nature of the dispute and the two parties can agree to coexist with one
another and agree to disagree. Tolerance as it was dealt with in the West Virginia
primary was really a far less substantial form of understanding, however, and came in
the end just to be the absence or denial of intolerance.
The traditional arguments against Catholicism that most Protestants,
particularly in the poor and less sophisticated country of West Virginia, tended to
latch onto were the simple and most basic elements that separated the two faiths.
More prominent and better educated Protestants could no doubt frame the
arguments in a more sophisticated manner, but to the poor West Virginian farmer
who spent most of his time tending to his meager fields in a tenuous struggle for
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survival, the argument would more than likely appear to him like it did to this man:
"People here aren't anti-Kennedy. They are simply concerned about the domination
of the Catholic church." [41] Or, the argument may have appeared as it did to one
West Virginian woman who said that she did not see anything wrong with being a
Catholic, necessarily, but if you are going to be a Catholic you should be a good one
and not believe in the separation of church and state.
Leaders in the Protestant community were defmitely put in a bind by the
candidacy of Kennedy. Listening to their poorer brethren they must have recognized
the essence of their Protestant faith as they have worked over generations to
formulate it here in the United States which for so long had been looked upon as
their Protestant promised land. Now many of them were forced to deny it. Many
Protestant ministers railed publicly and in their sermons about the evils of a Catholic
presidency and Kennedy's effort to circulate an open letter through the community
of Protestant leaders calling for religious tolerance produced only thirteen
signatures--Billy Graham, pastor to numerous presidents, refused to sign and in a
later sermon stated that religion would definitely be a major and legitimate issue
"whether we like it or not." [42] Even the signatories to the open letter calling for
religious tolerance in the election found it necessary to preface it by stating their
continued opposition to the Roman Church. Given the political climate, however,
most Protestants could see that some compromise would have to be made and sought
to do it in some favorable manner. The ministers who signed the petition were
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praised in the media for their tolerance, but the media, more an institution whose
business it is not to offend and whose purpose is largely to advertise to as wide an
audience as possible, have no overarching beliefs to defend and nothing to which they
must remain consistent. Unfortunately for most Protestants, their very name
imphes opposition to Catholicism and the presidency was often looked upon as the
very embodiment of their ideals and faith; these types of beliefs are very deep seeded
and are beyond the scope of simple reason. Tolerance is one value but consistency,
heritage, and fidelity are also values. The problem was that while Billy Graham may
have been able to artfully defend his position, the average Protestant who was
confronted with this dilemma did so with solidity and simplicity of argument that
could easily be construed as being bigoted. According to one woman who was
perplexed by this issue, "we have enough trouble in West Virginia let alone to be
called bigots too." [43)
A very complex and long standing difference of opinion between the Catholic
church in Rome and various Protestant churches, was boiling down in West Virginia
to a question of appearances. It simply did not look good to seem bigoted and here
was an opportunity presented by the Kennedy campaign for good West Virginians to
show the world that they were open minded and fair. In the tradition of many great
ad campaigns, the Kennedy campaign was appealing to the vanity of the voter.
Leaving aside its moral dimensions, tolerance in the Kennedy campaign in West
Virginia, and later in his fight against Richard Nixon, was the next must-have
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commodity that all Americans should have and he was offering it at bargain rates:
after all it is much easier to show one's tolerance by supporting a handsome Catholic
than it is to support other, more demanding and less appealing, causes.
In many respects, the success of the Kennedy campaign concerning the

religious issue was really in removing the whole issue of religion out of the frame of
the debate and thus it marks a milestone in the pushing of religion to the margins of
American society. In fact, in looking over the various national magazines from the
period it is possible to see how much things have changed since then. Religion, and
of course particularly the Protestant religion, was frequently included as an integral
aspect of U. S. policy debate, both foreign and domestic. Protestant ministers were
frequently quoted in news articles on a variety of subjects. The cause of the United
States as leader of the free world was so intertwined in the minds of many Americans
with the principles of their Protestant faith as a product of their upbringing that a
prominent Protestant, J. Howard Pew, would feel perfectly comfortable to state in
a U.S. News and World Report article about the role of religion in America's civic
and foreign affairs that "freedom can only exist where people accept Christianity."
[44] The article from which this quote is taken is of broader interest because it
represents what could be described as a liberal Protestant viewpoint which was
coming to the fore amidst the general unrest of the Cold War and, in particular,
amidst the furor of a potential Catholic president. It was written in contrast to other
Protestants who saw political debate and world affairs in strictly religious terms. Its
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philosophic nature concerning the role of Protestantism in American society neatly
lays out the traditional Protestant theological principles worked into American
government and culture that were prevalent among both liberal and conservative
Protestants at the time the election. Pew writes
Our Foundin9 Fathers were a stron9ly reli9ious people over 60 per cent ef them bein9 ef
Calvinistic stock ... They reco9nized that some 9ovemment was necessary order was to
be maintained, but they were also convinced that the more divine authority the people
would accept as rule for their conduct, the less 9ovemmental authority would be

if

necessary. And so they set up a pattern to live by, in which Christianity, morality, self
discipline, freedom and limited 9overnment all played an important part. [45 J

Pew goes on to quote a United Presbyterian clergyman arguing that the
United Presbyterian Church should not speak out definitively on political matters
because that was "essentially the Roman Catholic view."[46] Even though Pew
argues for less open involvement of the Church in political affairs, he does so by first
asserting that political affairs in the United States were themselves essentially molded
by religious concerns. While on the surface Pew is trying to display his modern
liberal, pseudo-secular humanist, viewpoint by arguing that the state of human affairs
in the twentieth century is too complex to be looked at through the prism of

religious beliefs, he is at the same time cleverly underlining the basic Protestant
nature of American civilization by stressing the fact that the separation of church and
state fundamental to its constitution was done by religious minded men not to
preserve the sanctity of the state but rather to preserve the sanctity of their
Protestant faith and that freedom is a Christian and implicitly Protestant concept.
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Consequently, Pew argues that Protestant Americans should welcome the possibility
of a Catholic president because, first of all, America is so fundamentally Protestant in
its composition that it has nothing to fear, and, second, because to do otherwise
would be essentially Catholic. Here we have nicely spelled out the strategy of
tactical retreat carried out by liberal Protestants during the Kennedy campaign.
They were hoping to making concessions in order to preserve the predominantly
Protestant make-up of American society; or, in the words of Pew, that the righteous
and dominant cause of Protestantism in American society will best be served by
"moral suasion" and not the "commands" of the state. Unfortunately, by bowing out
gracefully Protestantism in America was not able maintain its moral sway over
America. American government has become anything but limited and its role, along
with that of the media, as a source of secularism in American culture has eclipsed the
dominant position once held by religion and Protestantism. While still undisputedly
a force, it has nonetheless become a marginal force and early forty years later, it
would seem highly out of place for a mainstream national news magazine to quote
religious authorities in the context of U.S. foreign policy.
As Americans were increasingly challenged to see beyond the parameters of
their religious upbringing, they ultimately came to see themselves on more secular
terms. The media and in particular television had long been presenting an image of
American life outside the confmes of religion. Images had to be universal and a
secular lifestyle is much more acceptable to the broad spectrum of the American
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public. Consequently in the visions of American life that became so prevalent and
powerful during the 1950s and were presented to the American public via TV,
religion was almost completely absent--we have no idea what sort of religion Lucy
and Ricky Ricardo practiced, or the Cleavers, or Donna Reed's TV family. The
media in general and TV in particular require that conflict be minimized and
whatever conflict that is to arise be presented in a manner that can be resolved. On
TV, therefore, in dramas and comedies we are presented with a world without
fundamental principles and subsequently without any basis for profound conflict.
The manner in which the religious issue was handled during the Kennedy campaign
mirrored this trend and tolerance was largely viewed with respect to appearances by
the abandonment of sources of conflict.
Appearances in general proved an insurmountable obstacle for Humphrey as
he just did not seem to be a winner. In the fmal days of the campaign, he and his staff
made an all out push to "go over the hump with Humphrey.,, A debate with
Kennedy was scheduled but since the two had no real substantive differences it
proved completely inconsequential. Kennedy was able to show his mastery of TV's
visual medium by bringing a visual prop of a federal care package to the West
Virginia poor to hold up before the cameras as a reminder of the meager proportions
of government assistance they received. This simple gesture attracted the attention
and votes of more West Virginians than Humphrey did with long speeches.
Humphrey was completely ineffectual on TV and at times even looked incompetent.
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In a telethon aired the day before the election, Humphrey decided as a candidate of
the people he would answer telephone calls cold and without the screening that was
commonly practiced on live TV. The whole exercise was a debacle. Humphrey had
to listen patiently to long-winded callers as he watched his precious air time slip
away, all the while forced to keep a courteous and understanding demeanor. One
old woman caller greeted the hapless Humphrey by saying "you git out, you hear!
You can't stand the Republicans gitting ahead of you! Why don't you git out?" [47]
The final mishap in what turned out to be a comedic performance worthy of Peter
Seller, s Inspector Clouseau was when Humphrey went to a line to receive a caller
only to be interrupted by the operator telling Humphrey to clear the line for an
emergency (the caller was calling from a party line). Humphrey tried in vain to
explain that he was a candidate for the President of the United States conducting a
television telethon on live TV, only to be unceremoniously cut off.
In contrast, Kennedy was his usual self presenting over and over again to the
voters his image of confidence and success. Kennedy was at home in front of the
television cameras and in putting on one of the fmest TV performances the noted and
experienced Theodore White had ever seen confronted the West Virginian voters
with the issue of religion in his campaign for the presidency of the United States
head-on.
Unsure of how to broach the issue, Kennedy and his staff decided at first to
simply ignore it and hammer away at their primary topic of the economy. As the
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campaign progressed Kennedy grew weary of this tactic and was particularly
concerned that he might be giving the impression of avoiding the issue. Prior to a
large paid telecast he asked Ted Sorensen to put on paper a few of the questions
Protestants had about the possibility of a Catholic president and planted those
questions in the audience, much to the surprise of most of his staff. When presented
with the question of the separation of church and state JFK peered directly into the
camera addressing the people of West Virginia (it is important to note that this
practice of directly addressing a TV camera while commonplace now among
candidates was a novel phenomenon to the TV viewers of that time since this
technique seemed strange to most political speakers more familiar with addressing
themselves to people and not technology) saying:

ef

ef

ef

so when any man stands on the steps the Capitol and takes the oath cdfice
President, he is swearing to support the separation church and state; he puts one
hand on the Bible and raises the other hand to God as he takes the oath. And he

ef

if

breaks his oath, he is not only committing a crime against the Constitution, for which
the Congress can impeach him--and should impeach him--but he is committing a sin
against God. (48)

Invoking the sacred nature of an oath taken before God on the sacred ground of the
Capitol and doing it in such a forthright manner was a sure way to convince the
hearts and minds of God-fearing and patriotic West Virginian people. It did not
make any difference that an oath taken which is extraneous to the principles of one's
faith is not necessarily binding (in the Catholic faith God is not at all interested in
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maintaining the boundaries between church and state and therefor would not serve as
a reliable arbiter of testimony given on that account)--that would be too involved,
the West Virginian people made their decision because they believed Kennedy ,
because he was personally convincing.
On election day, Kennedy, betraying an uncharacteristic lack of confidence,
flew to Washington. As the results were tallied, Kennedy and Jacqueline dined with
some friends and afterwards Jack went out to see a movie with a few of them. When
. he got back late that morning, he received word that he had won the West Virginia
primary. Kennedy had overwhelmed Humphrey with some sixty percent of the
vote. Kennedy was now set to go into the convention with the strong momentum of
primary success--in fact, he ended up winning each and every primary he entered as
he had told his sister he must do: New Hampshire , Wisconsin, Nebraska, Oregon,
West Virginia, and Maryland. Even with this tremendous mandate from the
American voters, Kennedy was leaving nothing to chance and he and his staff went
into the Los Angeles convention prepared for an all out dog fight for the nomination.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Gene ral Election

The D emocratic National Con vention at Los Angeles

Kennedy ' s penchant for communications was particularly felt at the
Democratic National Convention. At the convention center, Kennedy used a
sophisticated electronic media command center including walkie-talkies and
independently connected telephones. [49] The command center was set up opposite
the convention center and was manned twenty-four hours a day. Through this
system the Kennedy staff could coordinate the movements of its agents on the
convention floor--many of the staff members carried primitive precursors to beepers
which were then called locators--and get the jump on their rivals. [50] The Kennedy
staff also created an immense card catalogue of all the convention delegates, whether
Kennedy called them by their first, last, or nick names, where their hotel rooms
were and where they might be in their off time.
In addition to this Salinger also was able to set up a convention newspaper.
The paper appeared as much as possible to be neutral and covered the activities of all
the candidates but of course always focused the attention of the reader back to
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Kennedy. Salinger had the paper hand delivered by his staff to all the convention
delegates.[51] The paper ran for three issues. As he did for the reporters he wanted
to make it as easy as possible for the delegates to keep up with the goings on of the
convention and in particular of Kennedy.
The main purpose of the convention, however, was to establish a platform for
the Democratic Party in the upcoming elections. This was a crucial opportunity for
Kennedy to pull together all the themes of his campaign up to that point and present
them to the American public in a unified and persuasive manner. Much of the
success of Kennedy and the longevity of his image has to be credited to the themes
which he introduced during his election campaign and his ability to fashion from the
consumerist philosophy of lifestyle and personal fulfillment, then rising to
preeminence, a deeper message of idealism. This message was to take shape in
Kennedy' s vision of America expressed at the Los Angeles convention in what would
be known as the New Frontier.
Before he could unveil that New Frontier, Kennedy of course had to take care
of the dirty business of actually winning the nomination and choosing a running
mate. The tremendous amount of work the Kennedy staff put into setting up its
communications systems, compiling delegate information, and generally staying on
top of the chaos that was the convention made sure that Kennedy would be able to
successfully ride out a last minute Stevenson rally and the best efforts of Lyndon
Johnson to throw the convention into a deadlock. With all fifteen of Wyoming's
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delegates going to him, thanks to some behind the scenes wrangling by Ted
Kennedy, Kennedy won a majority of the delegates on the first ballot. Seeing all
their hard work and planning come to fruition in so complete a manner made Robert
Kennedy comment that this was the happiest day of his life (52]. Unfortunately, the
following day would be, also in his words, the worst day of his life as he saw the
candidacy for vice president go to Lyndon Johnson. Many people questioned
Johnson's commitment to what prominent Democratic Party leader, Chester
Bowles, called the "strong civil rights plank in the Democratic platform" (53] and saw
the addition of Johnson to the ticket as too much of a compromise--Kennedy's
eventual narrow margin of victory would show the incontrovertible wisdom of
putting Johnson on the ticket with Kennedy as he was able to provide for the
Democrats crucial Southern support.
Having won the nomination and selected a running mate, Kennedy was finally
prepared to accept his party's nomination for president of the United States from
Adlai Stevenson and present to the world his vision of the future and the New
Frontier. JFK opened his acceptance speech with a proclamation concerning "The
Rights of Man" that would be worthy of the rhetoric of the French Revolution. The
overall tone of the speech was bold and sweeping. Kennedy pressed the advantage of
the Democrats in the battle of rhetoric concerning the direction of mankind which
the Cold War had developed into; his emphasis on a "new frontier" and a "new
generation" was directed toward a future of glittering possibilities. The watch
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words of Republicanism concerning caution, prudence, and tradition were
reformulated through Kennedy' s rhetoric to represent timidity, prejudice, and
smallmindedness and were shown to have no place in the great future of the
American nation.
Using the age-old American metaphor of the pioneer, Kennedy insisted that
these founders of the American nation "were not captives of their own doubts, the
prisoners of their own price tags. Their motto was not 'every man for himself : --but
'all for the common cause. "'[54] Even if the success of the American pioneers may
have actually had more to do with their caution, prudence, and tradition then
Kennedy would have liked us to believe, in the America of the late 1950s and early
1960s this vision of American pioneers as brave, adventurous, and indomitable was
extremely popular thanks in large measure to the highly successful TV westerns of
that era such as Gunsmoke and The Rifleman.
Kennedy went on to say that "some would say ... that there is no longer an
American frontier." "But," he quickly countered,

I tell you the New Frontier is here, whether we seek it or not. Beyond that frontier are

efscience and space, unsolved problems ef peace and war,
unconquered pockets ef i9norance and prejudice, unanswered questions ef poverry and
surplus. It would be easier to shrink backjrom thatfrontier, to look to the sefe
mediocriry ef the past, to be lulled by 9ood intentions and hi9h rhetoric--and those who
prefer that course should not cast their votesfor me, re9ardless ef parry.
the uncharted areas
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Kennedy provided an excellent image and one that was bound to strike a resonant
chord in the American public. To the holy cause of taming the wilderness that was
implicit in the early history of the United States and its purpose of "manifest
destiny" --one that millions of Americans relived every evening through television
westerns- -Kennedy added a new and never ending cause to tame the modern
frontiers of space and time, human poverty and suffering, and to secure the very
future of mankind, a cause worthy of a great nation and one that no patriotic
American who believes in the competitive spirit of the American people could deny.
The foundation of that great cause was set, according to Kennedy, with the
progressive ideas laid out in Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom, Franklin Roosevelt's
New Deal, and Harry Truman's Fair Deal. But Kennedy's New Frontier was more than

just the evolution of those programs; it was their culmination and through it he
intended to offer the American people "not a set of promises," but instead "a set of
challenges."[55] Kennedy was careful not to portray the federal government as a
source for hand outs and to stress instead its role as a catalyst for change. But
whatever its role, he was intimating an American government with an active role in
the lives of its people as the coordinating body for its aspirations and as a vehicle for
its vision of the future of mankind to be brought to the world.
Kennedy was able to exploit the position of the Democrats to his advantage
and to the disadvantage of Nixon and the Republicans. In this new Cold War era,
the struggle was more than a battle of missiles and tanks. It was an ideological battle
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over the future direction of mankind. The Soviets through the language of
Communism had managed to stake a claim for themselves as representing the
vanguard of enlightened rational thought in the developing world and many young
nationalist leaders (Fidel Castro, Nassar, and Ho Chi Mhin being the most notable
examples) had come to see their vision as the more progressive one concerning the
future qf the world. In a climate that lends itself to progressivist activity the
advantage naturally goes to the Democratic Party. This, in truth, has nothing to do
with the merit of the positions argued or the actions proposed. Often times,
inactivity is preferable to counterproductive activity. The strength of a nation's
character and convictions can be determined by what it does not do just as much as
by what it does.
In this context, the brewing controversy during the 1960 campaign
concerning the so called "missile gap" is worth a brief examination. After some
notable successes on the part of the Soviets in their missile technology during the
closing years of the 1950s, the most notable being Sputnik, some stir was created in
the United States that we were falling behind the Soviets in this critical field.
President Eisenhower had at his disposal information that, in fact, we enjoyed a
sizable superiority to the Soviets in our missile strength and that if there was a
"missile gap" it was decidedly in America's favor. Concerned about the provocation
of a heightened armed race that release of this information would unleash and the
dangerous trend toward nuclear destabilization that would ensue, Eisenhower chose
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not to release this information. Here is evidence of an initiative not seized and a
demonstration of how the inaction of a top government official can be worthy of
praise. Future active government programs in the fighting of the Cold War such as
the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Vietnam War stand as further testimony to the fact
that frequently it is better to do nothing than to take ill-advised action.
Unfortunately, under the circumstances of the Cold War and also in the
arena of public media in which campaigns for election are fought out, inactivity can
never be an effective tool of persuasion. Media reports activity and not inactivity
placing a constant premium on doing something to solve problems, even if doing
something may actually be counter productive or if there is no solvable problem at
all. It has always been rare in the history of American politics, now it is completely
unheard of, for a politician to respond to the inquiries of the press concerning this or
that problem by saying there is nothing that either he or the government can do. No
matter what the issue or the problem, a politician has to show himself before the
press as actively concerned and in the process of doing something about "the
problem". In this light we can see the wisdom of Kennedy' s call to action evident in
his New Frontier speech, and in his ensuing rhetoric about "getting America moving
again." To the world in general and to the media who would carry that message to
the world, the active leadership of the United States would be the focus of attention.
Richard Nixon, by contrast, would counter during the months leading up to
the elections that America is moving and that our future was not in jeopardy. He
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would stress that America was far from being in decline and that it was stronger than
ever. He would term Kennedy's rhetoric as dangerous and provocative, or even as
defeatist. Regardless of being true or not, Nixon's position was a disadvantageous
one in the media--in this light it is interesting to note how the communist issue which
was initially so damaging to the Democrats and so demoralized them under the "red
scare" of the early 1950s, was able to be turned so fully to their advantage by
Kennedy.
After the tremendous high that was the convention in Los Angeles, Kennedy
was forced back into the doldrums of the special sessions of Congress called by
Lyndon Johnson. Initiated as a campaign ploy by candidate Johnson, these sessions
proved to be a tremendous waste of time and Kennedy was forced to sit on his hands
while Nixon orchestrated a very successful Republican convention and began his
campaigning throughout the nation.
After the Democratic convention, the workings of the Kennedy campaign and
all its general themes were pretty much in place. No attempt was made to alter what

was looked upon as a winning formula and all that was left for the Kennedy campaign
to do was to slam their election juggernaught into the opposition and see who was
still afloat after November 6. From the top down, the Kennedy staff was confident
in its abilities and preparation. Despite early polls showing Nixon with the lead
going into the election, they were certain the coming months would prove them the
better of the two organizations.
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Richard Nixon
The contrasts in background between Kennedy and Nixon are nothing short
of astonishing. Nixon was born to a dirt-poor California family in Yorba Linda.
They had a lemon grove and their father tried his hand at small business by opening
up a small grocery in town. The Nixon family got by but the father, Francis
Anthony, always felt somewhat inadequate; in a country where success is highly
valued, just getting by becomes something of a failure and the ambitions of his father
were never quite fulfilled. Nixon's mother, Hannah, proved to be a dominant force
in his life; he would, in fact, at the end of his political career make reference to her
as "a saint" just before leaving the White House for the last time. The Nixon family
were Quakers, that most Protestant of Protestant faiths (among the reformed
Christian churches of Europe the Quakers were one of the most radical in their
theology), and Richard Nixon's mother instilled in her son the strict religious
principles of her faith against excessive display, both of emotion and of one's own
abilities. Restraint and modesty were to Nixon the essence of his own beliefs and
identity as he grew up--obviously this would prove something of a problem later in
the pursuit of his chosen career as a politician.
Silent suffering was to be another. Richard Nixon's youngest brother died at
an early age and one of his older brothers grew ill from tuberculosis just as Richard
was graduating from college forcing him to give up a scholarship he had received to
Yale and to attend instead a local and less noteworthy college--the expense of caring
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for his brother left the Nixon family with nothing left over to support him so far
from home.
It is perhaps one of the greatest ironies about Nixon that men in the press like

Ben Bradley found him elusive and inscrutable as compared to the accessible and
open Kennedy. After reading Nixon's memoirs, which he wrote entirely by himself,
there emerges no clearer portrait of a man. One can see displayed all his faults and
virtues--his manipulative sentimentality as well as his insightful mind and
perserverent character. Any person attempting to research Kennedy, however, will
fmd no more elusive and enigmatic figure .
At the small Whittier College where he earned his undergraduate degree,
Nixon worked hard to distinguish and improve himself. In his memoirs he shows the
conscientiousness of a young man anxious to get away from the provincialism of his
home yet still desirous to maintain the principles of his upbringing. The motto of his
school club in that tiny community on the very edge of the W estem world provides a
touching glimpse into the world of a small town boy with big dreams: the motto was
"Ecrasons L'infame". Nixon did everything he could at Whittier, played on the
football team, acted in plays, and captained his debating team in addition to his
carrying out the life work of Voltaire in Southern California. His hard work paid off
with a scholarship to Duke law school where he graduated near the top of his class.
He returned to Whittier to work in a local law practice.
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Nixon had the big dreams of an ambitious man. In this he was the same as
Kennedy. But Nixon, in order to fulfill his dreams, had to work within the confines
of other men. Coming from a position of no power and no reputation, Nixon had to
rely upon the good graces of other men for his advancement. He had to get
scholarships. He had to get into law firms and when his political career began, he
had to get the support of party leadership.
In Whittier, he was well liked in his firm and his law practice prospered. Also
in Whittier, Nixon met and married his wife Pat; a woman to whom it seems he

remained faithful all his life. Nixon served in the Navy in W.W.11 and after the war
ran and was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as a member of the
Republican Party. He, like Kennedy, was a member of the freshmen class of
representatives in 1946. He was elected senator from California in 1950 and became
vice president of the United States under Eisenhower in 1952, a position he held
until the end of the elections and 1960.
Nixon and Kennedy were following converging career paths and in many
ways the contrasts between the two men were to serve as larger contrasts of broader
conflicts throughout the nation. The differences between the men became a
preoccupation with the press and Ben Bradley in his memoirs on the Kennedy era,
Conversations with Kennedy, gives examples of this phenomenon from an insider's

perspective worth examining. The first and most notable example of the difference
between the two men that he stresses is the relative ease, as mentioned before, of
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gaining access to Kennedy as compared to what Bradley describes as the ordeal of
trying to interview Nixon or one of his staff--here is provided some tangible proof
concerning the success of what Salinger called their number one strategy goal, that of
making the job of the press as easy as possible. Here we can see as well, developing
as a contrast between the two men, the outgoing and gregarious nature of Kennedy
compared to the shy and reserved nature of Nixon that would go on to become the
essence of their differences. In talking about Kennedy's charm, Bradley mentions an
episode where an incredulous reporter asked Kennedy about the crowd estimates his
staff were providing to the press; when asked how those estimates were arrived at,
Kennedy responded, "Plucky (Press Coordinator Pierre Salinger) counts the nuns
and multiplies by one-hundred." Bradley notes that through his sense of humor
Kennedy effectively killed what could have been a very damaging story about inflated
crowd estimates [56]. Bradley contrasts this with what he called in Nixon a complete
inability to be self deprecating in his humor. This had the effect of increasing tension
rather than diffusing it as Kennedy could. This winning over of the press was not
limited in its scope and according to Bradley: "Kennedy had better relations with the
press that any other president since Margenthaler invented linotype." [57] The
contrasts between expression and reserve that characterized the differences between
Kennedy and Nixon provided a foreshadowing oflarger divisions throughout the
nation that would come to the fore later in the decade and would organize under
their respective banners as the demonstrators and the silent majority.
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The sort of affability which Bradley credits to Kennedy is a tremendous asset
in any public figure's relation to the press. Kennedy understood, having himself
been a reporter, what the press and subsequently the public were interested in. They
were clamoring to get behind the facade of power and greatness to see what life in
that rarefied world was really like.
Many writers have pointed to Kennedy' s Catholic background as giving him
an intuitive sense of the role of monarchy in the eyes of the public. [58] There seems
to be some truth in this with respect to an understanding of the importance of
manners and style with which a monarch sets the tone for a society. For some time
the United States had lived with a crude utilitarian work ethic as the primary mode of
behavior. In the words of Calvin Coolidge, "the business of the United States is

business." People's mannerism, it was generally thought, should be dictated by the
simple and honest premise of work and necessity. There were of course some efforts
to fashion vague notions of aesthetic and style, most often awkwardly patched
together from the various European aristocracies the American rich sought to
emulate, as a means of crowning this rampant form of capitalist ethic in America (the
great mansions at Newport being a prime example) but the budding aristocrats could
never be quite convincing in their self-conscious roles and were never able to buck
the label of illegitimacy evident in their popular title as the "robber barons."
With Kennedy there seemed to be emerging a genuine home-grown man of
nobility. He had the air of European royalty but he also seemed to be unmistakably
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American. What is more, he seemed to be a man of the modern world. Modernity
was an element with which he seemed completely at home--his interest in and
comfort in front of the media being a prime example of this--and he moved about
this emerging modern landscape confidently showing all those uncertain yet aspirant
Americans whose ancestors had toiled in obscurity just how to behave in this new age
and how truly wonderful it is. In the words of Peirre Salinger, Kennedy "was a fresh
voice in American politics--a voice that cut through much of the polemic of our time,
and got down to a discussion of living in an atomic world."(59]
It is probably worth while to take a moment and try and get a handle on what

modernism and modernity is. Like many terms in history, the term modern is an
elusive one and tends to have different meanings at different times. For instance, the
Victorians considered themselves to be modern, as did the Communists, as do we.
Once again it maybe helpful to come upon some working definition of the term
through trying to describe it by what it is not. Modernism can, in whatever form it
takes, be contrasted against its predecessor in the context of European history.
Modernism is not Medieval Europe. It contrasts itself against the stagnation and
inefficiency that has often been (by modernists) associated with the Middle Ages.
Therefore modernism represents a dynamism in human conduct and in that sense it
is artificial in that humans in the modern setting regulate their lives by their own
terms in accordance with there own purposes and not by terms dictated solely by
their environment (i.e .. the rising and the setting of the sun, the summer and winter
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solstice etc.). To get people to relate more actively with their environment requires
motivation. Probably the greatest challenge of the various civilizations in the modern
era is to come upon some sort of rational for this dynamic and artificial way of life in
the modern world.
In keeping with the modernist ideal as it came to be formulated by American
consumerism, life was meant to be lived to the fullest.[60) Old inhibitions needed to
be shrugged off as remnants of a bygone era. Life was intended to be enjoyed. In
this line of thinking, Kennedy represented all these ideals. Progressively, many of
the traditional mores concerning sex were being broken down in the postwar era. In
the modern world as presented to the American public in television and cinema,
traditional ethics about sexuality were often presented as old fashioned or as
repressive. Although the public was at the time unaware of Kennedy' s private life
with women other than his wife, they certainly were aware of his tremendous sexual
charisma of which the legions of female "jumpers" who followed Kennedy wherever
he went, much in the same manner as they would with rock and roll stars, stood as
evidence. In the parlance of the budding youth movement which was just taking
shape under the Kennedy administration, the modern world should be free of the
"hang ups" that imprison people in the mentality of bygone eras. In many ways
Kennedy was the embodiment of that new era. As it turned out, Nixon, became
Kennedy's antithesis. Johnson was antithetical as well but in the words of media
historian Mary Watson: "Kennedy happens to look like a composite of all the good
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guy stereotypes TV has created [61f' and every stereotype needs its alter ego; a role
that, increasingly, Nixon came to fill.
It is interesting to note in reference to the power of the media to shape
opinions how in so many ways these stereotypes seem to fit in nicely with how
perceptions of these men eventually came to be fixed in the minds of the public.
Johnson could never fill the role of Kennedy' s nemesis. He was too bumbling and
did not seem capable of fitting the bill. Johnson was acutely aware of the Kennedy
image and in many ways felt imprisoned by it. Paul Henggeler in his book, The
Kennedy Persuasion, portrays a Johnson obsessed with the legacy of Kennedy as its

beneficiary, albeit illegitimate, as its caretaker, and as its prisoner. Johnson could
simply not get out of Kennedy' s shadow as far as his image was portrayed in the
media. In Nixon, by contrast, we can fmd a true villain worthy of a man like
Kennedy. He worked outside the media and appealed over their heads to the "silent
majority" of American people by calling for traditional values and conservatism; in
many ways he seemed reactionary to the ideals of Kennedy. These perceptions are
strong as well as persistent and can be best illustrated in the recent treatment of the
two men in Oliver Stone's two films, JFK and NIXON.

The Houston Ministerial Conference
The first bump in the rode for the Kennedy campaign during the general
election came once again from a religious issue that just refused to die. Nixon, of
course, was smart enough to avoid even the hint that he was going to capitalize on
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this issue but when a pastor of no less standing than Norman Vincent Peale openly
raised doubts about the compatibility of Kennedy' s religion with the office of the
president of the United States, he did nothing to ease those concerns. Peale was still
just the tip of the iceberg and in a memorandum written by Kennedy staffer, Ruth
Kingman, and circulated throughout the Kennedy staff the scope of the problem was
evident in "differing degrees and at several levels." Kingman went on the catagorize
the various groups of Protestant opposition to Kennedy including northern white
Protestants and Southern white Protestants, as well as Northern black and Southern
black Protestants. Each of these four groups was targeted separately and barraged
with leaflets, mailers, TV and radio spots, and letters designed to appeal to its
specific constituency. An effort was also made once again at trying to elicit from the
liberal Protestant community a call for tolerance in this political struggle.
The memo focused particular attention on the importance of the black
Protestant community. In this tight race the role of the black vote was seen as
critical for the Kennedy election and according to the memo the role of the church in
winning that vote was crucial. The memo states:

Special efforts should be made to enlist the aid ef Negro ministers, both in the North
and in the South, particularly in the South ... Negro parishioners traditionally look to
their pastorsfor guidance in all areas ef living. This influence should not be
underestimated, as these ministers are the key to the political attitudes q,(the :Oocks''.

[62](underlining in the original)
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It was looked upon with some measure of irony by Kennedy himself that many of the
religious leaders of the black civil rights movement were themselves prejudiced
against Catholics in high government and for that reason were hesitant to openly
support him.
In reference to this resistance in the black religious community, the memo

singles out the potential role of the wives of black religious leaders saying that "if
these men are reluctant to have their names used [in support for Kennedy or at least
in support for religious toleration], and some are, efforts should be make to enlist
support from their wives, many of whom feel free to speak, and do so with the
approval of the husbands." This tactic was to be used with spectacular success later
on in the campaign.
A conference was organized by the leading Protestant groups in the United
States in which the candidates would be given an opportunity to address themselves
to these groups on the topic of religion in politics. Nixon having nothing to prove
before the groups politely declined to attend. It was Kennedy whose views were of
interest to the Protestant community and he quickly agreed to speak before the
conference and before a nationally televised audience.
Having nothing really to add to his already near perfect performances on the
subject in West Virginia, Kennedy essentially rehashed the same arguments in the
same convincing style as he did earlier in the primaries--the only unusual occurrence
being that the flawlessly correct Kennedy was forced to wear brown shoes with a
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blue suit due to a mishap by one of his staff. For most of those in attendance and
many of those on TV, however, this was their first exposure to Kennedy and in what
everybody recognized to be a decidedly polite but hostile environment many were
impressed with his composure and the coolness of his argument. What came to be
known as the Houston Ministerial Conference was a smashing success for the
Kennedy campaign and they were to show exerpts from it thoughout the remainder
of the campaign.

The Debates
At the same time as the Houston Ministerial Conference, the details were
being worked out by the Kennedy and Nixon teams in cooperation with the
television networks to set up a televised debate between the two candidates. This
had never been done before and the TV networks were very anxious to put on the
debates as an example of the great value the medium could bring to the American
people as a public sevice--it was at this time that television was encountering
tremendous amounts of criticism in the public and in political circles for not fulfilling
its mandate to serve in the public interest. In order to put on the debates, in fact, an
article of the Federal Communications Committee's government charter regarding
broadcast television requiring equal time for all candidates for political office had to
be amended by Congress to allow a meeting of the two main candidates only,
excluding all fringe candidates. [63) Not surprisingly, a lot of interest was generated
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throughout the country in this first-ever televised debate. Unfortunately, however,
the approach of the public to this event was largely skewed by its perceptions of
other confrontational events covered by television. This meeting between Kennedy
and Nixon would take on more an air of a boxing match than a thoughtful debate of
the issues facing the country.
Four debates were arranged between the two candidates: the first in Chicago,
the second in Washington, the third a simulcast between Nixon in Los Angeles and
Kennedy in New York (a real feather in the cap of the broadcast industry), and the
fourth and fmal debate back in New York. Kennedy and his staff were quick to
accept the proposed debates as they were at the time behind in the polls and the
debates offered an excellent chance to showcase their candidate to the national
public. In particular Kennedy needed to give the American public a good impression
of his capabilities and experience. Nixon, having been vice president for some eight
years, was the better known of the two candidates and was generally viewed as the
more experienced as well.
Coming into the debates Kennedy had everything to gain and almost nothing
to lose. Since televised debates had never before been held--and they would not be
done again for some sixteen years--Nixon was not really obligated to participate in
them and some of his advisors cautioned him against providing Kennedy with a
forum and by association elevating him to an equal stature. It is difficult to say what
political damage would have been done to the Nixon campaign if he had pulled out of
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the debates--in retrospect it is certain that Kennedy' s good showing in the debates
and his general exposure through them made a difference in his razor thin margin of
victory over Nixon--but refusing to debate Kennedy would have simply been out of
character for Nixon. He was always a confrontational political figure. He relished
the opportunity for debate and felt confident in his own debating skills. He also, like
Kennedy, was comfortable in the new medium of TV. His performances on TV in
his famous "Checkers" speech which salvaged his political career and his spot on the
GOP ticket in 1952 and his world renowned "Kitchen Debate" with So"iet leader
Krushchev were his previous successes in that medium. There simply was no
possibility that Nixon would not meet Kennedy in this first ever televised debate
even if as some suggest it may have cost him the election.[64]
Of the four debates it is the first which is singled out by most reporters at the
time as well as by historians since as being the most decisive. This makes sense, of
course, because it was the most anticipated and most viewed of the debates. Nixon
campaigned hard up to and including the day of the debate; he had scheduled several
meetings the day of the debate, September 26. Several days before the debate Nixon
had accidentally and somewhat severely injured his leg while getting out of a car. He
had spent some time in the hospital and the day of the debate many thought he
looked haggard. Having lost a few pounds, Nixon also looked a little thin in his shirt
collar.
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Kennedy, in contrast, had left the day of the debate free in his schedule and
spent the entire evening before going over potential questions with his advisors. He
had also spent some time shortly before the debate at his family compound in Florida
and looked the picture of health with a slight tan on his face.[65] Kennedy's staff
arrived at the studios early in the day to work out blocking and lighting for their
candidate. They worked closely with the debate's producers about how the show
was to be shot and generally attended to every detail in its production,[66] while
Nixon and his staff by contrast arrived at the studio only shortly before air time. His
staff was attentive enough to reverse some of the lighting decisions the shows
producers had made with the "help" of the Kennedy staff.
The two most crucial factors for which this historic debate will forever be
remembered, however, were put into play only minutes before air time. Nixon had
requested that the temperature in the studio be lowered to around sixty degrees and
just minutes before the debate applied makeup known as "lazy shave" to cover over
his fast growing facial hair. Kennedy, noticing the change in the temperature, asked
one of his staff to have it raised. When the staff member realized that it was as per
specific instructions of Nixon, he surreptitiously arranged for one of the stage hands
to have it raised via the main thermostats below the studio. [67] The debates will
always be remembered for the ill looking and gaunt appearance of Nixon as
compared to the youthful and healthy looking Kennedy but, what is more, many
Americans came to perceive the relative success of the two candidates based on their
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response to the debate itself and for those Americans the sight of Nixon wiping the
sweat away from his face and the distinct traces of make-up showing up in the camera
lights on his complexion were clear indications that Nixon was unnerved by
Kennedy.
This phenomenon in the first debate of the interplay between image and
perception is of interest in two ways. First, pertaining to the relative appearance of
the two men, the phenomenon is nothing short of ironic. Of the two men, Nixon
was by far the more healthy of the two. Behind that robust exterior that Kennedy
presented to the public, it is now known Kennedy hid a severe and debilitating
illness, Addison's disease. The second is that of those who were surveyed after the
debate to determine the relative effectiveness of the two men, the majority of those
who listened to the debate on radio found Nixon to have been the most effective
while those who watched on TV scored Kennedy as the winner; image, as deceptive
as it was, was clearly a decisive factor. Fortunately for Kennedy the overwhelming
majority of Americans, some seventy million (at that time the highest ever television
rating for any program), watched the debates on TV.[68]
The famous shot of Nixon wiping the sweat and makeup from his face is also
worth some closer attention. The shot, referred to in TV parlance as a "cut away",
was something of an anomaly. In fact there were very few "cutaways" during the
length of the debate; almost the whole time the camera invariably stayed with the
candidate who was speaking. It is hard to believe that of all the times in which a cut
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away could have taken place it was simply coincidence that it happened at this
particular and compromising moment. An aid to Kennedy remembers the event and
thinking as he saw the "cut away" on the screen that they had won--that is how
noticeable it was. [69] Beyond the possibility of favoritism which has already been
established in the press, it could be argued that the TV director in question, whose
political preferences are unknown and trained as all good television men are in
viewing television as a dramatic medium, simply picked up the shot because it
seemed to him to be evocative.
Although it would have probably been impossible to prevent the "showdown"
atmosphere of this, the first-ever presidential debate, the press and in particular the
television networks who were so anxious to stress their role as public servant could
have done more to at least try to dampen the drama of the event and the inevitable
distortions that it caused. It seems, however, that their own enthusiasm caused them
to get caught up in the excitement of the moment and that left them with no capacity
to reverse its course--at their worst moments, like the famous "cut away", they
rather shortsightedly added fuel to the fire.
On the whole, however , the first debate and the following three came off as
fairly well balanced, at least in the manner in which the two candidates were treated.

If one wants to closely analyze the performance of the journalist questioners it is
difficult to find any gross overall bias toward either candidate. It can be said,
however, that while each candidate got his share of soft questions, which amounted
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to nothing more than an opportunity for the candidate to give his views on a
particular issue, it seems that Nixon got a little more than his share of hard hitting
questions which are more aggressive and usually require the candidate to backtrack
and try to explain some inconsistency or some particularly embarrassing issue. One
questioner, for instance, asked Nixon to explain his self-proclaimed greater level of
experience in reference to an embarrassing comment made to the press by
Eisenhower (Eisenhower was asked to name some important administration
decisions in which Nixon was involved). To the question Eisenhower had
responded, "I don't know but give me a few days and I'll come up with some." This
was particularly a hard hitting question and one to which the befuddled Nixon could
not readily respond. Kennedy had to respond to some tough questions as well but
on the whole not as many and in this instance nothing nearly as tough even though
there were several equally embarrassing and inconsistent episodes in his political
career--his stand on McCarthy and his frec1uent absences and poor voting record in
Congress come to mind.
Despite Kennedy' s successes, the first debate and the others that followed
were fairly even and no decisive knockout blow was scored by either candidate.
Kennedy, it could be said--in keeping with the boxing metaphor--won by points on a
split decision. After the first debate, however, it has been widely recorded that there
was a noticeable upswing in the morale of the Kennedy camp while there was an
equal down swing in the morale of Nixon's. Concerned Republicans called Nixon's
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staff after the debate in Chicago to inquire whether or not Nixon was well while a
group of assembled Democratic governors who had been previously lukewarm to the
Kennedy campaign called the candidate to offer their full and enthusiastic support.
[70] Kennedy may have only just slightly got the better of Nixon in the debate but he
had completely proven himself as a competent and worthy adversary of Nixon and
that turned out to be in itself a tremendous-- and in retrospect, decisive- -victory for
Kennedy. In the words of Ted Sorensen, the crucial issue of Kennedy' s youth had
been completely "neutralized". [71]
During the debates, and particularly in the second debate, Kennedy was also
cleverly able to position himself to the right of Nixon on the crucial issue of Cuba.
Echoing previous claims during the 1952 presidential elections that the Democrats
had lost China, Kennedy turned the tables asserting that timidity in Republican
foreign policy had lost Cuba and that the current administration was doing nothing to
try to reverse the situation there. Kennedy was able to effectively establish his
credentials as a Cold Warrior.

Telephone call to Mrs. King
In the close race that was the election of 1960, the debates are one thing
which is often singled out as having turned the tide in Kennedy's favor; another
would be the African American vote. As can be seen in Kennedy aid Ruth
Kingman' s memo to Kennedy and the election staff, the black vote was looked upon

96

Bryan Wuthrich
Masters Thesis: The Kennedy Campaign of 1960
as crucial to the Kennedy camp and they worked feverishly, particularly in the black
press, to try and win over as many African Americans as they could to their side.
From 1936 to 1956 the black vote had been anywhere from 68-32 or 72-28
percent Democratic (Pittsburgh Courier, National Edition, Nov 5, 1960). In this
close contest, even a few black votes sacrificed to the Republicans were looked upon
as unthinkable by the Kennedy team. To bring the black vote even more to the fore,
the national edition of the Pittsburgh Courier, at that time one of the most
prominent voices in the black press, wrote on the week of the election:

We firmly believe that in 1960, Republicans had their best chance in twenty-eight
years to corral a substantial Negro vote. We know that as ofJuly 14, 1960, Negro voters were
faced with a real dilemma. The couldn't understand the "shot 9un" weddin9

ef Senators Lyndon

Johnson and John Kennedy. [72]

There was also the very public meeting between Kennedy and governor Patterson
and representative Max Engelhardt of Alabama, both vocal supporters of segregation,
after the convention and which the African American community felt was
particularly offensive.
Despite this opportunity, the Nixon campaign failed to capitalize on this
potential opening left by Kennedy. The title of the article from which the previous
quote was taken was, "Has the GOP Written Off Negro's Vote?" and the overall
answer given was, yes. For reasons that seem hard to understand, the Nixon
campaign did not actively pursue black support. One possible motive may have been
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to try to win the South by letting the Democrats self-destruct over the race issue.
This does not seem to be very wise since those southern whites who violently hated
Kennedy and the Democratic party's progressive civil rights plank were going to
vote against him no matter what and by trying to preserve votes that were to a large
degree reactionary and immutable he ended up losing votes that were uncommitted
and up for grabs.
At any rate, any quick look through the black press at the time of the elections
will turn up page after page of Kennedy advertisements directed specifically at the
African American community. There are advertisements showing pictures of
Kennedy with prominent black leaders: with Elmar C. Jackson, president of the
National Bar Association; with Congressman Willam S. Moorhead of Pittsburgh;
and Edward B. Toles, chairman of the NBA Judiciary Committee. There are
advertisement concerning Kennedy' s bold position on civil rights with a quote (with
more ellipses than Swiss cheese has holes) form Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of
the NAACP, saying:

The Senator's record, taken as a whole, and includin9 certainly hisJorthri9ht and

ef the Supreme Court public school dese9re9ation cases, must be
re9arded . . .as one ef the best votin9 records on civil ri9hts and related issues ef any
Senator in Con9ress .. . That record has been consistent in its espousal ef the civil ri9hts

repeated support

cause.[73]
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The same advertisement also contains a quote from black Congressman Adam Powell
stating that Nixon, the "Great Pretender, says he is in favor of civil rights. That is
not even a half-truth." Another advertisement touts the Democratic Party' s "Rights
of Man" and its sweeping and broad commitment to equal rights for black
Americans. To any African American who followed the black press it must have
been abundantly clear that John Kennedy was actively seeking his or her vote.
An article in the October 28th edition of the national edition of the Pittsburgh
Courier makes the situation plain: "From highly reliable sources we are informed
that Senator John Kennedy and his team are leaving no stone unturned to make the
most favorable impression on the Negro voters." The article, entitled "Which Party
Is Making Best Effort to Grab Negro Vote?", goes on to say: "As of today LJust over
one week to election day], the Democrats have by far the better organizational
structure to get the Negro vote. This is an incontrovertible fact ." The article ends
by saying "the best salesman will collect the Negro vote" and leaves no doubt as to
who the better salesman is.[74]
One other major victory which the Kennedy election campaign was able to
secure in its fight for the support of the black voter was more of a spontaneous
occurrence, although it is clear from Ruth Kingman' s memo that the ideas that
triggered it were already in the thoughts of the Kennedy staff. On October 19,
Martin Luther King was arrested with fifty-two other black civil rights workers in a
department store in Atlanta. They were attempting to desegregate the lunch counter
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there and were arrested for creating a public disturbance. Five days later all the
others arrested with Dr. King were released; King was held and later sentenced to
four months of hard labor on the basis of an outstanding traffic violation for which he
was still on probation.
A worker in the civil rights section of Kennedy's campaign, Harris Wofford
suggested to his superior, Sargent Shriver (Kennedy's brother-in-law), that Kennedy
telephone directly to Mrs. King in Georgia to express his concern. Shriver then
contacted Kennedy in Chicago. The candidate's r eaction, according to Theodore
White, was "impulsive, direct and immediate." [75] He called Mrs. King from his
hotel room and assured her of his interest and concern. Mrs. King later informed a
few of her closest friends and through channels of black leadership, the word swiftly
spread that Kennedy had intervened to protect the imprisoned King. Robert
Kennedy followed up with a telephoned plea for King's release to the judge who had
set the sentence and by Thursday King was free on bail.
In the November Sth edition of the Pittsburgh Courier Mrs. King stated
publicly that Kennedy had in fact called her and that she told him how much she
appreciated his concern and "hoped he would be of help." King upon his release
stated to the press that "I understand that Senator Kennedy served as a great
influence in effecting the release." And although King as a member of a non-partisan
organization would not state openly his choice for president, the whole event served
as a tremendous boost for the Kennedy campaign in getting out the black vote. In
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the words of King's father who was less concerned with protecting his non-partisan
image, "because this man [Kennedy] was willing to wipe the tears from my
daughter[inlaw]' s eyes, I've got a suitcase of votes, and I'm going to take them to Mr.
Kennedy and dump them in his lap." [76]

The tally
Kennedy and his staff spent election day at the family compound in Hyannis,
Massachusetts. The count remained inconclusive throughout the entire day and into
the night. By midnight, Kennedy had had enough and went to sleep with his brother
Bobby still manning the telephone lines and frantically keeping on top of the results
as they came in. The next day when he awoke he was president-elect of the United
States of America.
Kennedy won with a plurality of just one-tenth of one percent and a majority
of just over one-hundred thousand votes out of some sixty-eight and a half million
votes cast--he actually won fewer states that did Nixon, twenty-three to Nixon's
twenty-seven. In particular the razor thin margins of victory that Kennedy received
in the electorate rich states of Illinois and Texas were what turned the tide for
Kennedy in the election--two states with significant black voting populations,
incidentally.
In what was the closest presidential election this century, it is certain that the
clever positioning and use of the media by the Kennedy campaign particularly with
respect to the debates and the African American vote were what were the deciding
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factors in the struggle. Again, the Pittsburgh Courier national edition on July 23,
1960, in what would turn out to be some very prophetic words said:

His [Kennedy' selection} operation was so professional and so efficient that it has set in
motion a new era of political promotion which mi9ht revolutionize the entire process of
national elections.[77]

Kenney and his staff had achieved what they intended, but the effects of their
campaign would be much greater than winning the office of the presidency .
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Conclusion
The 1960 election was an example of a moment in the history of a culture
where the varying forces within it came together, wrestled with each other, and a
completely new cultural entity arose that while still having some connection with its
past was nonetheless vastly different from it. The victory of the United States in
W.W.11 set this country on a course that was once and for all severed from the way
of life in which it grew into one of the world's greatest powers. If one were to liken
it to the growth of a young child it is analogous to that one moment in that child's

life where he reaches boldly beyond the world of his childhood and from that
moment on he struck with the bitter and liberating realization that there is no
turning back. Of course the seemingly safe and inviolable world of childhood is but a
an illusion just as the image of this country existing in its own version of splendid
isolation was equally deceptive. The truth of the matter is that the child through his
own actions destroys that illusion just as the world as he grows to maturity is bound
to recognize the potency he represents and react to him--it is probably much better
that the child destroys the illusion than he let the world do it for him. The break
with the pleasing and nurturing illusions of republican virtue and American
exceptionalism was in the making for some time, through the industrial revolution
and W.W. I, but somehow Americans could still fall back on these comforting and

103

complacent ideas that they lived in a different world than everyone else and that they
were safe there.
After W.W.11, however, things had changed. There would be no going back
to the way things were. In many ways it was as if a new nation had been born.
Before the citizens of America dangled a new perception of the world which they had
long thought to be there but which was now tantalizingly right before their faces. It
was a world of almost limitless possibilities and one that seemed more or less open to
be shaped at their will. Simultaneous with this realization was the companion
realization that the world (or some power in it) had seen us. W e were not alone in
the world. We were no longer safe and there would no longer be any buffer
whether in distance or in other nations between us and the hostile fury of a
competitor. This moment of realization is not maturity but only the recognition of
its potential, both for the good and for the bad. It sets into motion a fury of activity
that directs the individual or nation on a course of preparation for the future where
the actor hopes to thrust himself into the world and realize himself there.
By the time of the 1960 campaign of John F. Kennedy America stood poised
to do this and realize itself on the world stage. Within JFK' s election team were
arrayed all the strengths of this nation, its intellectual muscle, its industrial and
economic muscle, and its marketing muscle. JFK himself had even fought for this
country and achieved victory in battle. He advocated a strong military as well, but
what is more he represented all the strengths of this country and the consumer
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culture engine that gave them power and he wove them all into an ideology of what
Americans were and how they interacted with their world that is the most
fundamental requirement of any culture. He symbolized what modern America was,
to ourselves and the world. Consequently, the issues of his campaign were to be the
main issues of what life in the modern world had to offer the citizens of this country
as well as the challenges it posed.
One major component into this new flowering of American culture was the
influence of what has been termed America's immigrant population w hich emigrated
to the U.S. from Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
struggle of the American immigrant population had for nearly a century been the
dominant them e of American social and domestic history. Its effects were much
broader than simply the issue of various immigrant families trying to make a way for
themselves in a difficult environment. As soon as these huge populations of Irish,
German, Polish, and Italian (among others) immigrant groups found their way onto
American soil, all "nonimmigrant" groups knew that their arrival meant changes in
American culture beyond the needed supply of labor they repr esented. Their arrival
marked a territorial battle for cultural hegemony in the United States that turned up
in countless aspects of American life over the course of the next hundred years. The
labor movement, the temperance movement, the Progressive movement, the Ku
Klux Klan and the Red Scare of the twenties, as well as the battle between organized
crime and the FBI, all of these were battlefields in a larger war for cultural power in
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America. The election of Jolm Kennedy marked the end of that chapter in American
history, at least for the European immigrant population.
In the history of any era, it is interesting to note how seldom historians deal
with the concept of ambition in the figures they examine. Generally, if it is
mentioned at all it is done so as a criticism. Normally if an historian is favorably
disposed to his subject, he ignores ambition entirely and either takes it for granted
that his subject would achieve the powerful position in life he has attained--as if by
some personal tide of destiny--or, and this is most often the case for American
historians in their coverage of American historical figures, he is characterized as being
drawn to the heavy burden of leadership reluctantly, out of responsibility toward his
country in its hour of need. It is something of a taboo for historians to admit that
their favorite historical subjects may have been driven to power on the basis of a
personal interest in it. With respect to Kennedy, this has become a focus of debate,
whether or not he was driven by personal or family ambition.
We have already seen how Kennedy represents the sociological force of Irish
Catholic ambition in particular and immigrant ambition in general toward social
legitimacy and there is as well represented in the Kennedy campaign and the
subsequent Kennedy administration a national ambition to display to the world a
vision of American power and leadership that I will discuss more later . But there are
as well other aspects to ambition evident in the Kennedy campaign. For instance
there is no escaping the fact that it was primarily the drive of the Kennedy family
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itself that made the Kennedy organization run so smoothly. Particularly with respect
to Robert Kennedy, it is clear that he was motivated by a sense of family loyalty and
family honor that went beyond a level that could be matched by the ordinary, or
even extraordinary for that matter, professional campaigner. This was a sense of
familial esprit de corps that was found throughout the Kennedy family and found its
way as well through to the upper levels of the campaign staff (some of whom like
Sargent Shriver were even related to the Kennedys by marriage) and down into the
rank and file. No doubt, much of the charm which has been ascribed to the Kennedy
campaign in its ability to bring people on board and attract a dedicated volunteer
force comes from that appearance of selfless devotion that has its roots in the
Kennedy family ambition. Of course with any family ambition, as dedicated to the
collective cause that any of the individual members may be, one can not say that their
drive is selfless, at least not in a complete sense. Family ambition has a very selfish
motive in trying to impose the force of the family name in culture by turning it into a
cultural symbol. To do this it seeks esteem by occupying its most coveted positions
and laying claim to the various symbols and representations of virtue that exist within
a given culture. In the case of Kennedy campaign, clearly, the cause of establishing
the Kennedy name was their overarching and unifying goal, as it was as well with the
Roosevelt and Adams family names I mentioned at the beginning of this work. This
striving for a family dynasty was a major force behind the Kennedy campaign. It
should not be viewed solely as a negative although the irony of the situation is that
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within the ideology of traditional republicanism that has for so long been a part of
American culture there is no place for ambition, familial or otherwise; it is simply
not considered to be virtuous. Consequently one of the virtues that one often finds
claimed by various ambitious American families of Anglo-Saxon stock prior to
Kennedy is their avowed lack of ambition. The incongruity of this aspect of
republican ideology constantly being invoked by certain historical figures to establish
their virtue and greatness in the eyes of the public in order to satisfy their ambition
can at times be nothing short of astonishing.[78] The Kennedys were, contrary to
Anglo-Saxon republican etiquette, openly ambitious and this to many was
reprehensible. To gain some perspective on this heated issue, perhaps we should
recognize, condone, and even at times applaud ambition and thus by keeping this
issue in the open it can be approached realistically. from the perspective that the
public virtues we all value so highly very often stem from private vices or ambitions.
Ambition is, after all, one of the primary elements that makes a consumer culture
run and as such is an integral aspect of modern American life.
The nation before the Kennedy campaign was struggling to find some sense of
self direction within its new role as leader of the free world which it was our
collective ambition to fill. All the elements that went into formulating the American
Cold War ideology existed and were well known before the election of 1960. The
election did not create anything new but instead effectively drew together some
powerful cultural concepts that had long been in currency in American society and
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unified them into a cohesive whole that pointed to a new future and destiny that was
both appealing and convincing. Kennedy and his staff, from that very first general
meeting in October, 1959, were aware that their cause would be best served by
focusing on the dynamism symbolized in their young candidate. At his press
conference announcing his candidacy, Kennedy stressed his new vision for the future
of the nation and his ideas of"how to give direction to our traditional moral purpose,
awakening every Americans to the dangers and opportunities that confront us. 11 (79)
Throughout the campaign the speech writing staff led by Sorensen worked on this
theme of destiny and greatness laying dormant in the American people; in the battle
of rhetoric during the election they proved themselves the undisputed masters of the
field time and again. In Kennedy they had a speaker who seemed not only to be
unafraid of the atomic age and the Cold War but who when he spoke could actually
make these difficult and intimidating times seem welcome. More than any other
candidate Kennedy embraced the challenges of the modern world without any
hesitation and without any fear and this separated him from the pack. Kennedy' s
writers sensed this and could see its effect on the crowd. Consequently they honed
their words and their themes with increasing clarity and potency towards the goal of
coming up with an overall conceptual framework for Kennedy and the nation that
would prove resonant. By the time of the Democratic National Convention, they
had sown together an impressive piece of work in the New Frontier.
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The New Frontier has gone on to become the lasting vision of America's
national ambition in the crisis of the Cold War and even beyond. Its themes and
rhetoric about a never ending battle against the challenges to mankind are still a part
of the cultural fabric of this nation. 1998' s number one movie at the box office,
Arma9eddon, shows just how potent this legacy is since it manages to maintain this

same message of American spirit in the face of adversity even in a post-Cold War
world--coincidentally, as if rhetorical homage were not enough and so as to make the

link with the spirit of Kennedy' s New Frontier completely inescapable, a Kennedy
election poster features prominently in a shot midway through the movie.
Arma9eddon is, of course, not the only example but only one of many instances where

the images and rhetoric of Kennedy' s New Frontier have been recycled throughout
the media.
One historian has lamented the lack of study of the effects of Kennedy' s
rhetoric on the nation. [80] I would like to second that lament. Within the confines
of this work, I have come in contact with the potency of this rhetoric and its
associated imagery, and it seems to have been very influential on much of the
provocative rhetoric and the unrest that was prominent later in the decade. In
particular, the rhetoric of the Students for a Democratic Society and the New Left
comes to mind and seems very evocative of Kennedy' s rhetoric . It is unwise to
underestimate the power of words well put together and presented from positions of
power and respect, especially on the young mind. Unfortunately, many historians
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view political rhetoric as just so much fluff or confine its role to simple
reinforcement. Words, however, are the primary way in which humans orient
themselves in the universe. Other animals can rely on land marks or scents.
Humans see themselves and act through words. Probably neither the speech writers
or Kennedy himself had any idea of the possible impact their words could have. This
is surprising of course in the sense that they were obviously writing and speaking
those words to make an impact but consciously they were only thinking of the
immediate goal of winning the presidency. Its impact, however, went well beyond
that. The general conceptual framework they put together linking the nations past
to its present and pointing the whole toward a future of sacrifice and challenge but
pregnant with the possibility of greatness was very effective in influencing the
thinking of their audience on deeper levels than the immediate question of which
man they would vote into office. It would be interesting to examine how much
effect Kennedy' s rhetoric had on the minds of those young men and women who in
groups like the Students for a Democratic Society would use rhetoric of similar
urgency later in the decade.
The rhetoric that Kennedy and his staff developed during the campaign to
help formulate the issues of the nation and their vision of its future were without
doubt among the most potent in American history. The fact that this also occurred
at a time when the media had developed enough to record and broadcast that
rhetoric and the images of its delivery to every living citizen and actually bring him
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or her face to face with the speaker probably makes Kennedy' s rhetoric the most
potent in history in the degree to which it as penetrated and impacted society. Even
to this day, Kennedy' s speeches are probably the most rebroadcast of any historical
American figure.
This last fact may have some future impact the office of the presidency in the
United States. Increasingly, Americans, as they grow up and learn what a president
is, are going to get an idea of the president as an historical institution based on images

they have seen as much on the rhetoric that goes along with them. As I have already
said, Kennedy is a president with no shortage of filmed images. If only for this fact,
he is going to beat out his predecessors in becoming the template of what Americans
look for in their president. As for his successors to office, it could be argued that
none reached his level image recognition and stature--the only real competitor to the
Kennedy legacy as a rival for the cultural image of what a modern president should
look like is Ronald Reagan and although its too early to tell which of the two images

will have a more lasting impact I think at this time the edge could be given to
Kennedy because his image for some reason has become less associated with
partisanship (both Democrats and Republicans are just as likely to invoke the
Kennedy image, Dan Quale did in the 1988 campaign, while it would be unthinkable
for a Democrat to openly flaunt his association with Reagan). In the years since
Kennedy we have had two presidents, Carter and particularly Clinton, who have
shared his image of youth and vigor and numerous candidates such as Hart and
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Dukakis who were, if only for a brief time, very popular. This type of image and
presentation was unprecedented in the years before Kennedy and, in the years since,
is poised on the verge of becoming a standard image of what Americans expect their
president to look like. Only time will tell how far and to what degree this trend will
continue.

Consumer culture and the challenges of life in the modern American
In the Wisconsin campaign, Humphrey, as we noted before, complained that
he felt like the comer grocer up against the chain store. It seems with Humphrey we
have the last remnants of populism as an active force in American politics
(eventhough it had a brief resurgence later with Jimmy Carter) and his defeat
provides a nice landmark of transition into a form of political campaigning much
more oriented toward the concerns of consumer culture. The question arises: what
kind of effect has this had on traditional notions of the media and the public sphere
(the debating forum of public opinion)? The media and the public sphere have
always been the fundamental institutions in the culture of democracy envisioned by
our founding fathers. Their faith in the will of the people was predicated on their
means and ability of being able to rationally debate ideas. It is important to note that
the principle goal of democratic civilization was not to improve the standard of living
of its citizens but rather to liberate them and allow them to become freethinking
citizens of reason. This was true when looked at from either the Protestant vision of
civilization or the Humanist vision.
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The question has always been asked of democratic civilizations: how free and
how just are the People you speak so highly of--are they really capable of governing
themselves? With the advent of the industrial revolution and the huge market
economies, these questions have only intensified as the sturdy and independent
yeoman farmer so long the cornerstone of democratic rhetoric faded into oblivion.
The great early twentieth century thinkers, John Dewey and Walter Lippmann,
attempted to reformulate the eighteenth century concepts of the m edia and the
public sphere in order to simultaneously preserve their spirit while also updating
them for the twentieth century. They both concluded that the public sphere, while
under stress, could still through modern means of communication fulfill its main
function as a liberating force from human ignorance and domination by facilitating
man's rational pursuit of truth. Both men remained true to that time honored
tradition among m odem democratic theorists of placing a premium on man 's
capacity for innovation and invention to overcome whatever obstacles may be placed
in his path toward freedom. Differing only in the amount of faith each ascribed to
the communication professional (Lippmann) and the freethinking individual (Dewey)
as the ultimate solution to the problem posed by mass media and mass markets, they
both concluded that the media and the public sphere could continue and, in fact,
improve upon its responsibility to enlighten the minds of men through the aid of
m odem technology.
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Years later, however, at the same time as Kennedy' s campaign and across the
ocean in Germany, a young sociologist and thinker named Jurgen Habermas was
working on a seminal piece of his own that would revolutionize the concept of the
media and the public sphere with respect to its place within the modern consumer
culture. This work, entitled The Structural Traniformation of the Public Sphere, traced
the development of the public sphere from its ancient existence in Medieval Europe,
to its nascent modern incarnations in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
to its final form in the later part of the twentieth century. His conclusions
concerning the nature of the contemporary media and the public sphere with respect
to their original function within the conceptual framework of the early modern
philosophies of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries (discussed above in reference
to Dewey and Lippmann) are that they have completely changed. They no longer
serve the societal function of fostering rational-critical debate originally intended for
them by their founders in the Enlightenment. The fundamental premise of removing
authority (Habermas uses the word authority in its connotation as a coercive and
irrational force to achieve obedience) from government that was the central goal of
the Enlightenment by subjecting authority to r eason and thereby transforming it
from authority to liberating truth is no longer furthered by the public sphere.
With the rapid and rampant growth of the market economies during the latter
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Habermas argues, came a transformation of
the traditional concepts of the private (in this case economic) and public (in this case
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governmental) spheres that was the lynch pin of Liberal Enlightenment philosophy.
This change also affected, according to Habermas, the function of the public sphere
in its purpose as a rational-critical body designed to arrive at truth and mitigate
authority. The collection of private individuals that was the public sphere was no
longer deemed capable to act in its own interest to protect itself from the incursions
of authority from the private sector.[81] This new phase of government control over
the private sector which for so long had been the antithesis of Enlightenment
ideology Habermas refers to as "the refeudalization" of society [82] and was done
under the overall premise of preserving the spirit of Enlightenment. Habermas
comments on this phenomenon using a quote from the famous German despot,
Frederick the Great, "everything for the people and nothing by them"; rational
critical debate had a tendency to be replaced by consumption.[83]
These themes of Habermas can be seen reflected to a remarkable degree in the
Kennedy campaign of 1960. It is clear that with respect to, for instance, the
religious issue, there was no real debate. The success of the Kennedy campaign in
that issue was in its ability to come up with a winning formula that would resonate
with the public. The real issues were ignored and, reflecting Habermas' s argument,
the debate was largely shaped by the mass media. (84] Kennedy and his team came up
with their argument and the role of the public was only one of acclaimation--do they
clap or do they not clap? In particular, the power of TV in stilling debate as noted by
Habermas is well demonstrated. It was, after all Kennedy's TV performance in that
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West Virginia primary that was singled out by the journalist Theodore White as
being the greatest performance of the entire campaign. Kennedy that day directed
his argument directly at the camera and "personally" to the viewer. Within the
context of how this exchanged is shaped by the medium of TV, it was entirely one
way. As Habermas phrases it, the public viewing television has no opportunity to
"talk back."[85] All they can do is agree or disagree, or, in the language of
consumerism, they can buy it or not buy it. In the case of West Virginia and later the
nation as a whole, they bought it.
In order to get their victory on this crucial issue of religion the Kennedy team

had to utilize the tools of opinion management which according to Habermas mimic
the functions of the public sphere intended by its founders in the eighteenth century
by giving the "false consciousness" to its audience that they are "a critically reflecting
private people influencing public opinion" when in fact they are being persuaded by
hidden symbols of identification, dramatic presentation of the facts, and calculated
stereotypes.(86] The voting public of West Virginia never really thoughtfully
debated the issue of religion in democracy. They were simply presented the two
stereotypes of the bigoted and the tolerant citizen by a compelling and engaging
speaker who invoked all the various symbols of virtue and solemnity he could work
into his argument. Then they were asked to make a choice, yes or no. The people
are free, yes; there is no gun to their head telling them how to choose. But the
public sphere was never meant to only be a choice between two options, like
117

choosing between Coke or Pepsi. The freedom of the public in this sense is not that
of a critically thinking public but only of a critically choosing public and ultimately
choice is limited and almost exclusively determined by presentation. Similarly, there
was little debate on the nature of America's role as leader of the free world in the
Cold War during. It centered mainly around the appealing rhetoric and images with
which each candidate could decorate their vision. Ultimately it was those of
Kennedy and his New Frontier which were seen as the m ost attractive--in truth
Kennedy won largely by default as neither Humphrey nor Nixon really came up with
an encompassing and convincing vision of the future (Humphrey seemed to want to
return to the past while Nixon seemed satisfied with the present) and this probably
had much to do with their failure to connect with their potential voters.
Finally, it is worth stating simply the basic dilemma posed by the legacy of the
Kennedy campaign of 1960. We have entered, probably irreversibly, into the era of
consumer culture and as Humphrey said it, "chain store" politics. Despite the often
heard complaints to the contrary, this has given us tremendous efficiency for a nation
the size of the United States. And, in truth, that does not m ean the bad connotation
of efficiency, blind obedience and heartlessness, that Humphrey derided but instead
the efficiency of a government and a political process that is largely very responsive
to the material and emotional needs of its constituency. The Soviet Union has often
been called efficient--at least in the sense that it was described as machine like--but if
there were a natural disaster, the citizen was largely on his own. If you sent a letter
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across Russia there was a good chance that it would not get to its destination. The
system works so well in America because of consumerism. It is a highly responsive
and self correcting ideology. The problem, as Habermas points out, is that it is a
system that operates through the auspices of competing interests and is largely
self-driven and from the point of view of the individual completely irrational and
beyond his or her control. It is also a system almost completely devoid of any strong
principles or character. From the president to the average citizen you can be assured
that the system will take care of you so long as you work within it but, consequently,
you are never truly free in the sense of being a rational, critical-thinking citizen with
some sense of broader perspective and purpose--you are only a part in the process.
We are all increasingly subject to a benign, efficient, but unrelenting authority that is
the consensus of the marketplace, or to reiterate the words of that enlightened
despot, Frederick the Great, and mix them with John Kennedy we live in a "New
Frontier" but it is one where "everything [is] for the people and nothing [is] by them."
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